Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System by Leslie, Melanie B. & Sterk, Stewart E.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-30-2015
Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the
Wealth Transmission System
Melanie B. Leslie
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Leslie@yu.edu
Stewart E. Sterk
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, sterk@yu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Taxation-
Federal Estate and Gift Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melanie B. Leslie and Stewart E. Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission
System, 56 B.C.L. Rev. 61 (2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol56/iss1/3
  61 
REVISITING THE REVOLUTION: 
REINTEGRATING THE WEALTH 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 
MELANIE B. LESLIE* 
STEWART E. STERK** 
Abstract: Thirty years ago, John Langbein published “The Nonprobate 
Revolution and the Future of Succession.” The article celebrated testators’ 
newfound ability to avoid the expense and delay of the probate court system by 
holding assets in a variety of non-probate devices, such as retirement and bank 
accounts with beneficiary designations and revocable trusts. Langbein high-
lighted problems the revolution might generate and predicted how they might 
be resolved. Since then, significant problems have indeed developed. First, 
wills law doctrines designed to effectuate intent of testators have not been uni-
versally extended to non-probate transfers. Second, the fragmentation of the 
wealth transmission process has created coordination problems that did not 
exist when almost all of a decedent’s assets passed through the decedent’s pro-
bate estate. This has increased opportunities for attorney error. Even when at-
torneys get it right, rogue clients can easily undermine a carefully constructed 
estate plan, and the law does not always allow courts to correct these errors. 
Third, the non-probate system increases the potential for wrongful takers to 
dissipate assets before rightful beneficiaries have an opportunity to make 
claims to those assets. As we explain, neither lawyers, financial institutions nor 
the legal system have successfully resolved these issues. We advance several 
proposals that might ameliorate the costs of the non-probate system, such as 
conferring broader power on estate executors to coordinate non-probate assets, 
and a voluntary registration system that would reduce the risk of inadvertent 
conflicts among wealth transmission documents. 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago, in one of the most influential articles ever written about 
Trusts and Estates, Professor John Langbein observed and celebrated the end 
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of what he called the “probate monopoly” and the growth of a parallel system 
of non-probate transfers.1 Langbein noted, correctly, that for many testators 
and beneficiaries, the opportunity to bypass the probate process would avoid 
wasteful expense and delay.2 Langbein did not ignore potential problems gen-
erated by the “nonprobate revolution,” but was optimistic that those problems 
would be solved. 
When the probate system dominated the wealth transmission process, a 
single document—the will—controlled most gratuitous transfers made by all 
but the very richest property owners. Executing a will required formalities de-
signed to ensure that the document reflected the decedent’s intent. The probate 
process mandated some judicial supervision of all estates, providing, at least in 
theory, additional protection against distributions inconsistent with the dece-
dent’s wishes.  
The proliferation of mechanisms for transferring property at death outside 
the probate process—revocable trusts, “payable on death” (“POD”) bank ac-
counts, beneficiary designations on retirement accounts and life insurance pol-
icies3—presented challenges for the legal system. Langbein identified three 
such challenges.4 First, how would the system ensure that the non-probate in-
struments of transfer, often prepared without formalities and without lawyer 
involvement, would accurately reflect the intent of the decedent? 5 Second, 
how would the system coordinate distribution of a fragmented estate, in which 
multiple documents rather than a single will would govern the transmission of 
the decedent’s wealth?6 Third, what substitutes would emerge for the protec-
tions afforded by judicial supervision of the probate estate? On this score 
Langbein surmised that hard cases—those that require judicial supervision—
would end up in court just as they do in a system that requires judicial supervi-
sion of all cases, hard and easy.7 
                                                                                                                           
 1 John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1108, 1129 (1984). 
 2 Id. at 1116–17. As Langbein put it, many transferors “view probate as little more than a tax 
imposed for the benefit of court functionaries and lawyers.” Id. at 1117. 
 3 Id. at 1109. As Langbein observed, “It would not be unusual for someone in mid-life to have a 
dozen or more will substitutes in force, whether or not he had a will.” Id. 
 4 See id. at 1120, 1137, 1140; infra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 5 Langbein, supra note 1, at 1137 (indicating that financial intermediaries are generally careful in 
the wording of transfer forms, but that business practice would not overcome the absence of “subsidi-
ary rules” designed to reflect transferor intent). 
 6 Id. at 1140 (noting danger that transferor may “neglect to update one or more components of an 
estate that involves numerous instruments”). 
 7 Id. at 1120 (noting that the probate system backstops the practice of financial intermediaries and 
stating that “[f]inancial intermediaries execute easy transfers and shunt the hard ones over to probate. 
In the nonprobate system, genuine disputes still reach the courts, but routine administration does 
not.”). 
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Three decades later, it is time for reassessment. The use of revocable 
trusts and POD accounts has expanded, aided in many states by statutory 
changes. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), in 
its infancy thirty years ago, has provoked a revolution of its own. In the course 
of that revolution, it has dramatically increased the dollar volume of assets 
likely to pass outside the probate system.8 For many people planning their es-
tates, the will is now the least important document in their estate plan. This 
expansion in the importance of the non-probate system makes it imperative to 
evaluate the legal system’s responses to the challenges Professor Langbein 
identified.9 
Although the non-probate system has adequately met the needs of most 
decedents—particularly those with the most traditional and typical estate 
plans—the legal system has not met all of the challenges Langbein identified.10 
The practicing bar bears part of the blame. Too many lawyers have been slow 
to appreciate the changing landscape of succession law, and, as a result, have 
served their clients poorly. This Article aims to highlight the pitfalls that law-
yers face in the current environment, with the hope that more of them will 
avoid errors that frustrate the estate plans of their clients. 
Many of the problems, however, are beyond the capacity of the practicing 
bar to fix—either because clients do not consult them when preparing estate 
planning documents, or because clients act on their own to undo the work of 
their lawyers. Neither financial intermediaries nor legal doctrine have adapted 
to this situation. Part I argues that financial intermediaries have not developed 
forms designed to effectuate the intent of their clients, and that state legisla-
tures have been slow to make the changes that would overcome the deficien-
cies in non-probate instruments of transfer.11 Part II demonstrates that asset 
coordination remains a significant problem in a world where people inevitably 
rely on multiple instruments, often executed at different times and outside the 
presence of lawyers, to transfer their assets upon death.12 Part III examines the 
greater potential for asset dissipation that may reduce the value of judicial su-
pervision for at least some beneficiaries.13  
These problems are not serious enough to relinquish the cost savings gener-
ated by the non-probate system. Part IV, therefore, focuses on potential reforms: 
statutory designation forms, expanded authority over non-probate transfers for 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See generally Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Accidental Inheritance: Retirement Ac-
counts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV 165 (2014) (providing a detailed discus-
sion of ERISA’s impact on the probate system). 
 9 See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1120, 1137, 1140. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See infra notes 15–105 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes106–273 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 274–298 and accompanying text. 
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estate executors and administrators, and a voluntary registration system to en-
hance asset coordination.14 These reforms would better enable the non-probate 
system to meet the challenges identified by Professor Langbein thirty years ago. 
I. ENSURING THAT NON-PROBATE INSTRUMENTS REFLECT  
TESTAMENTARY INTENT 
Two factors combine to ensure that a decedent’s properly executed will 
passes her probate assets to her intended beneficiaries: the formalities sur-
rounding execution (which often include lawyer supervision), and a set of 
well-developed, intent-effectuating, rules of construction. Decedents’ non-
probate assets, by contrast, are often distributed pursuant to documents execut-
ed with fewer formalities and without the benefit of comparable constructional 
rules. Moreover, the beneficiary designation forms financial institutions pro-
vide for distribution of non-probate assets are often designed not to ensure ef-
fectuation of decedent intent, but rather to minimize inconvenience for the fi-
nancial institution.  
This Part explores how the confluence of these factors leads to frustration 
of decedent intent. Section A discusses the process by which beneficiaries are 
typically chosen in the probate system,15 while Section B discusses beneficiary 
selection in the non-probate world.16 Section C critiques the forms commonly 
used to designate beneficiaries in non-probate instruments.17 Finally, Section D 
analyzes the challenges involved in effectuating the intent of an incapacitated 
testator.18 
A. The Process of Selecting Beneficiaries in the Probate World 
Any person who sets out to make a gratuitous transfer starts with one or 
more objectives in mind: to provide for a spouse, children, a favorite charity, a 
faithful friend, or some combination. In the probate system, two features in-
crease the likelihood that the testator will achieve those objectives. First, in 
part because of the formalities associated with execution of wills, lawyers of-
ten supervise preparation of wills. Second, wills doctrine includes rules of con-
struction designed to fill gaps in poorly drafted wills, and to account for events 
that occur after execution of the will.  
The classic testator consults a lawyer, who acts to refine the testator’s ob-
jectives—principally by identifying legal alternatives and factual possibilities 
that the testator might not have independently contemplated. Once the lawyer 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 299–313 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 25–73 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 89–105 and accompanying text. 
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refines the testator’s objectives, the lawyer translates those objectives into lan-
guage designed to ensure that they are accomplished.  
For instance, suppose a testator approaches a lawyer and indicates that 
she wants to divide her property between her husband and her children, with 
perhaps some provisions for her husband’s children. The lawyer might ask 
whether the testator would prefer to set up a trust, so that the husband would 
be the primary beneficiary during his lifetime, with the remainder to pass to 
the children upon death. The lawyer would certainly ask how much property 
the testator has to advise the testator about potential tax consequences. In addi-
tion, a thorough lawyer would certainly ask whether the testator has considered 
how property for the children should be distributed if one of them happens to 
die before the testator, or before the testator’s husband. Armed with the testa-
tor’s responses, the lawyer would then draft a will (and potentially other doc-
uments) designed to accomplish settlor’s objectives.  
Moreover, if the will the lawyer drafts is not sufficiently clear, or if unan-
ticipated circumstances arise, statutes and common law rules of construction 
operate to reflect the intent of the average testator. Imagine, for instance, a tes-
tator who writes a will leaving $10,000 to her sister and dividing the balance of 
her estate between her husband and their daughter. When testator dies ten years 
later, her sister has already died, she is divorced from her first husband and she 
has remarried. She has also had a son with her new husband. How would testa-
tor’s estate be distributed? 
Every state has an anti-lapse statute that “saves” bequests to close relatives 
of the testator who have predeceased the testator.19 So, absent language in the 
will, the testator’s sister’s bequest would pass to the sister’s descendants.20 Simi-
larly, almost every state would treat divorce as an act that revokes a bequest to 
the divorced spouse, so that the testator’s first husband would not share in the 
testator’s estate.21 The Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) also includes a provision 
that would give a share of the estate to a spouse who married the testator after 
execution of the testator’s will, giving the testator’s new husband a share of the 
estate.22 Some states, including those that have adopted a version of the UPC, 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110 (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 
(LexisNexis 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 2-603 (West Supp. 2014); N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42 (2013); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 2514(9) (2010); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 255.151–.154 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2013 
Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature) (formerly codified as TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 
(West 2003)). 
 20 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 546 (2013). 
 21 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6122 (West 2009); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 
(McKinney Supp. 2014); UNIF. PROBATE CODE, § 2-804 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 330–32 (2013). 
 22 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 192 (2013). 
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also provide a share for afterborn children, subject to some qualifications.23 So, 
if the UPC were in force, the sister and the testator’s first husband would not 
inherit, even though they are named in the will, and the sister’s descendants 
would share, even though they are not named in the will. These statutes, then, 
provide a backstop to capture the presumed intent of similarly situated testators 
even when a will itself does not contemplate events that would almost certainly 
have caused the testator, if she had thought about them, to modify the language 
of the will.24 
B. Beneficiary Selection in the Non-Probate World: Construction Doctrines 
The process of establishing a revocable trust sometimes mirrors the pro-
cess of preparing a will. Lawyers often serve as intermediaries, ensuring that 
the trust instrument reflects the trust settlor’s intent. But increasingly, inade-
quately trained non-lawyers are marketing revocable trusts.25 Lawyers rarely 
supervise other non-probate transfers, including retirement accounts, POD ac-
counts, and life insurance policies. As a result, construction doctrines must 
play a more important role if the goal is to ensure that clients achieve their ob-
jectives. Although legislatures and courts have made progress in adapting wills 
law doctrines to other non-probate transfers, the adaptation process is far from 
complete—even in jurisdictions that have enacted the UPC. The following 
three Subsections illustrate the way in which the UPC and state law have at-
tempted to effectuate testator’s intent in light of a change in the testator’s or 
beneficiary’s circumstances.26 Subsection 1 discusses the revocation-upon-
divorce rule and how non-probate assets can frustrate a divorced decedent’s 
intent.27 Subsection 2 describes the way that state law, and the UPC in particu-
lar, has dealt with marriage or the birth of a child as well as the issues caused 
by non-probate assets, especially retirement accounts, in those circumstances.28 
Subsection 3 analyzes the result when a beneficiary predeceases the testator 
with regards to both probate and non-probate property and highlights the role 
of forms in designating beneficiaries of non-probate property.29  
                                                                                                                           
 23 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (McKinney Supp. 2014); UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 194–95 (2013). 
 24 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603, 8 U.L.A. 546 (providing that in the case where a devi-
see does not survive the testator, and is a sufficiently close relative, a substitute gift to the devisee’s 
descendants will be created subject to certain limitations); Id. § 2-804, 8 U.L.A. 330–32 (providing 
that divorce revokes both probate and non-probate transfers). 
 25 See generally Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts in the Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good 
Thing Gone Bad, 59 MD. L. REV 595 (2000) (describing the consequences of non-lawyers creating 
and selling revocable living trusts). 
 26 See infra notes 30–73 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 30–41and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 42–57 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 58–73 and accompanying text. 
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1. Divorce 
UPC section 2-804 applies the revocation-upon-divorce rule both to wills 
and to other revocable testamentary transfers.30 The statute provides that di-
vorce or annulment “revokes any revocable disposition . . . of property made 
by a divorced individual to his [or her] former spouse in a governing instru-
ment” and any disposition in a governing instrument “to a relative of the di-
vorced individual’s former spouse.”31 
Yet, for two reasons, the distribution of non-probate assets often frustrates 
the divorced decedent’s intent. First, a number of states have failed to extend 
the revocation-on-divorce rule uniformly to both revocable trusts and contracts 
with beneficiary designations. Some states cling to older revocation statutes 
that revoke only will provisions.32 Others take a more piecemeal approach.33 
For example, both Illinois34 and New Hampshire35 law provide that divorce 
automatically revokes provisions in both wills and revocable trusts that pertain 
to the ex-spouse. Neither, however, extends this rule to beneficiary designa-
tions in contracts, such as life insurance, IRAs or POD provisions.36 California 
statutes provide for automatic revocation on divorce for wills and all non-
probate instruments except for life insurance policies.37 
Second, ERISA precludes application of UPC section 2-804 and similar 
statutes to non-probate accounts, such as life insurance and retirement plan 
savings accounts that are provided by the deceased’s employer as part of an 
employee-benefits package.38 ERISA, which governs the administration and 
                                                                                                                           
 30 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 331 (2013). 
 31 Id. 
 32 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-109; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-257c (2013); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 12, § 209 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-49 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-508 (2014); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-8 (LexisNexis 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-610 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 394.092 (LexisNexis 2011); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1608 (2000); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, 
§ 2-508 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105 (LexisNexis 2011); NEB. REV. ST. ANN. 
§ 30-2333 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(II) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (2013); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-202 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-6 (LexisNexis 2011). See generally 
Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 QUINNIPIAC PROB. 
L.J. 83 (2004) (discussing the history of revocation-on-divorce statutes and the need to expand such 
statutes to include will substitutes). 
 33 See generally Kristen P. Raymond, Note, Double Trouble—An Ex-Spouse’s Life Insurance 
Beneficiary Status & State Automatic Revocation Upon Divorce Statutes: Who Gets What?, 19 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 399, 402 (2013) (noting that in some states, including Michigan, Colorado, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Ohio, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Texas, “a final divorce automatically revokes the status of the 
designated spouse as a beneficiary and terminates their right to the life insurance proceeds of their 
former spouse”). 
 34 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-7(b) (2012); Id. 45/2-6(b); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2012). 
 35 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(II) (2007). 
 36 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-7(b) (2012); Id. 45/2-6(b); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 (2012); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:13(II) (2007). 
 37 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 5600(c), 5601, 6122 (West 2009). 
 38 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), (c) (2012). 
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distribution of these assets, expressly provides that it “shall supersede any and 
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee ben-
efit plan” covered by ERISA.39 In 2001, in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Supreme 
Court of the United States construed this preemption provision broadly to hold 
that plan administrators are required to distribute assets in accordance with the 
plan documents even if state law might command a different result.40 Thus, 
ERISA preempts state-law revocation on divorce statutes with respect to any 
non-probate asset that is employer provided.41  
As a result, the assets of a decedent who failed to change beneficiary des-
ignations after divorce may be distributed inconsistently. To illustrate, suppose 
that soon after her marriage, a testator executes a will naming her husband as 
her beneficiary. Thereafter, she accumulates a mutual fund account, and, as 
part of her employee-benefits package, a 401K and a life insurance policy. She 
names her husband as the death beneficiary of all the non-probate assets. After 
the testator and her husband go through an acrimonious divorce, the testator 
dies unexpectedly before engaging in any post-divorce estate planning. Will 
the ex-husband be entitled to any of the testator’s assets? 
If the testator were domiciled in a state with a modern revocation-on-
divorce statute, the ex-husband would not be entitled to any of the testator’s 
probate assets or the proceeds of the mutual fund account. Due to the ERISA 
preemption rule, he would collect the proceeds of the employer-provided re-
tirement account and life insurance policy. 
2. Marriage or Birth of a Child 
a. State Law  
Many state statutes give an omitted spouse or child rights to claim a por-
tion of the deceased spouse’s estate when the deceased’s will was executed 
prior to the marriage or the child’s birth. While some statutes provide that mar-
riage or birth of a child revokes a previous will,42 most are more elaborate in 
the quest to effectuate the presumed intent of most testators. For example, UPC 
section 2-302 provides that only a child born or adopted after the will’s execu-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. § 1144(a). 
 40 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001); see also Katherine A. McAllister, Note, A Distinction Without a 
Difference? ERISA Preemption and the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-on-Divorce 
and Slayer Statutes, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1481, 1490–93 (2011) (discussing the Egelhoff case in the con-
text of the overlap between ERISA preemption and the substantive law of wills). 
 41 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law, 67 VAND. 
L. REV. 1635, 1639–40 (2014). 
 42 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-48(a) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-610 (2005) (subsequent 
marriage plus birth or adoption of child revokes will); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1705; MD. CODE ANN., 
EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105 (LexisNexis 2011) (subsequent marriage plus birth of child revokes will); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-3 (2013) (will is revoked if no child living when will executed). 
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tion can claim a share of the testator’s estate, and then only if: (i) the testator 
has other children and the will makes a provision for those children, or the tes-
tator has no other children and his will does not leave substantially all of his 
estate to the omitted child’s other parent;43 (ii) it does not appear from the will 
that the omission was intentional; and (iii) the testator failed to provide for the 
omitted child by a transfer outside the will. With respect to omitted spouses, 
UPC section 2-301 provides that the omitted spouse is entitled to her intestate 
share of assets not devised to testator’s descendants, unless it appears that the 
testator intended the will be effective even if he/she subsequently married, the 
will was made in contemplation of marriage, or the testator provided for that 
spouse by non-probate transfers.44 
The UPC confines the omitted spouse and child’s rights to a share of pro-
bate assets, which can operate to frustrate the probable intent of testators who 
neglect to amend their beneficiary designations or revocable trusts after mar-
riage.45 In this sense, the UPC is typical of most states.46 Drafting omitted 
spouse and child statutes to account for non-probate transfers would be ex-
ceedingly complex. Nevertheless, the failure of these statutes to recognize rev-
ocable living trusts as will substitutes is especially problematic because the 
trust often holds the bulk of the client’s assets. Placing most assets in the trust 
allows the settlor to avoid probate—the pour-over will operates only to mop up 
                                                                                                                           
 43 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 194–95 (2013). For examples of 
statutes modeled on section 2-302, see ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.302 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14-2302 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11302 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.302 (West 2010); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-302 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-302 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-
1-3-8 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit.18-A, § 2-302 (2012). 
 44 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301(a)(1), (3) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 192 (2013); see also 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18A § 2-301 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-15 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 75-2-301 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). Omitted spouses in common law property states may be able to 
exercise a right to elect. The UPC and other modern elective share statutes include most non-probate 
assets in the value of the estate for elective share purposes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.203 
(2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-202 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-203 (2006); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-6a203 (2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-203 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-
222 (2013); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney Supp. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 30.1-05-02 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-203 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-203 (Lex-
isNexis Supp. 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-3-2 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 45 In some of the decided cases, courts advanced testator’s probable intent by not applying these 
statutes to non-probate transfers. In In re Estate of Jackson, 194 P.3d 1269, 1275 (Okla. 2008), Kid-
well v. Rhew, 268 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Ark. 2007), and Robbins v. Johnson, 780 A.2d 1282, 1284 (N.H. 
2001), the courts had to apply omitted child statutes that allow any child not expressly mentioned in 
the will, including one born before the will was executed, to claim a share of the estate. In all three 
cases, it was clear that the testator did not intend to benefit the omitted child. See Jackson, 194 P.3d at 
1275; Kidwell, 268 S.W.3d at 310; Robbins, 780 A.2d at 1283. Because these are state supreme court 
cases, they will likely be read broadly, treated as a matter of black letter law, and are likely to produce 
intent-defeating results when applied by lower courts in the future. 
 46 See, e.g., Jackson, 194 P.3d at 1275; Kidwell, 268 S.W.3d at 312; Robbins, 780 A.2d at 1284; 
In re Estate of Cayo, 342 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
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any assets not transferred to the trust during life.47 Thus, the failure to include 
the value of the assets in the revocable trust when determining the omitted 
spouse or child’s share—even if understandable pragmatically in light of the 
difficulty of drafting and enacting the necessary legislation—cannot be justi-
fied conceptually or as a policy matter.48 
In sum, an omitted child or spouse whose loved one took pains to avoid 
probate is worse off than the omitted child or spouse of someone who dies with 
a simple will or engaged in no planning. Consider an example involving testa-
tor A and testator B. Assume that both women executed simple wills devising 
all of their estate to their parents, that each subsequently married and had a 
child, and that neither revoked her will or executed a new one before dying 
unexpectedly. Suppose that all of testator A’s assets, totaling $100,000, passed 
through probate at her death. Suppose testator B’s probate estate is of negligi-
ble value, but she died owning an IRA ($20,000), a savings account with a 
POD designation ($10,000), a life insurance policy ($50,000) and mutual fund 
account ($20,000). She filled out the beneficiary designations before her 
child’s birth and named her parents as beneficiaries. Testator A’s spouse and 
child are entitled to their intestate shares of her estate. Testator B’s child will 
receive nothing and her spouse may not fare much better. Under a modern 
elective share statute, the spouse may be entitled to a fractional share of testa-
tor B’s non-probate assets,49 but because elective share statutes are not de-
signed to be intent effectuating, testator B’s spouse may end up with less of her 
estate than testator B would have preferred.50 
The limited reach of these statutes can also operate to defeat intent by 
giving a spouse or child more than the deceased intended to give. In Prestie v. 
                                                                                                                           
 47 In one case, the court was able to shield the revocable trust from the omitted spouse’s share 
while effectuating intent. In Bell v. Estate of Bell, the testator’s children from a prior marriage were 
the principal beneficiaries of testator’s revocable trust. 181 P.3d 708, 710 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). Ap-
plying UPC section 2-301, the court ruled that the omitted spouse could obtain a share only of the 
estate assets. Id. at 713. Because there were no estate assets, the spouse was entitled to nothing—the 
same result the court would have reached if all of the assets were included, because the testator’s 
children from a prior marriage were trust beneficiaries. Id. at 716.  
 48 California has amended its probate code to allow omitted children and spouses to obtain a share 
of assets in a revocable living trust. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21601 (West 2011) (defining “testamen-
tary instruments” as including wills and revocable trusts); id. § 21601(b) (including revocable trusts in 
the definition of “estate”); id. § 21610 (providing that an omitted spouse is entitled to a share of the 
deceased spouse’s “estate”); id. § 21620 (providing that an omitted child is entitled to a share of the 
deceased spouse’s “estate”). 
 49 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1-1.A (McKinney Supp. 2014); UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE §§ 2-201 to -207 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 441–66 (2013). 
 50 For example, the UPC keys the amount of the surviving spouse’s elective share to the length of 
the marriage. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203(b) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 153–54 (2013). Thus, a 
surviving spouse who was married to the decedent for two years is entitled to end up with only twelve 
percent of the value of their combined property. See id. 
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Prestie,51 the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s order awarding 
testator’s wife an intestate share of testator’s probate estate, even though testa-
tor had provided for his wife through his revocable trust, on the ground that the 
statute applied unless the spouse was provided for in the will.52 Although the 
court expressly acknowledged that “modern estate planning regularly utilizes 
revocable inter vivos trusts with pour-over wills,” and that the usual procedure 
for amending an estate plan was to amend the trust, not the will, it chose to 
apply the plain meaning of the statute.53 
b. Omitted Spouse and Child Statutes and ERISA-Governed Retirement 
Accounts  
ERISA creates no protection for children of account holders.54 Given 
ERISA preemption, the only way to ensure that a child receives the proceeds 
of an ERISA governed account is to fill out a beneficiary designation form af-
ter the child’s birth. Conversely, the omitted spouse will have rights to those 
accounts regardless of what the plan participant’s beneficiary designation di-
rects. ERISA provides that upon marriage, a spouse obtains a legal right to 
some or all of the account holder’s retirement account.55 Therefore, a new 
spouse automatically becomes the beneficiary of an employer-sponsored ac-
count, regardless of what the plan participant’s beneficiary designation directs. 
Although the ERISA provisions granting spousal rights are not motivated by a 
concern for effectuating intent, the provisions may in fact comport with ac-
count holders’ intentions in many cases. In other cases, however, an account 
holder might erroneously assume that the beneficiary designation executed 
prior to marriage will remain valid afterward. ERISA, however, contains no 
provisions authorizing a court to consider the deceased spouse’s preferences. 
Account holders frequently assume that a prenuptial agreement can extin-
guish the new spouse’s rights to any retirement account proceeds. Neverthe-
less, federal courts agree56 that no matter how clearly a prenuptial agreement 
                                                                                                                           
 51 138 P.3d 520, 525 (Nev. 2006). The testator had divorced his wife, Maria, and later executed a 
pour-over will and living trust naming Scott, his son from an earlier marriage, as trustee and primary 
beneficiary of the trust. Id. at 521. Testator experienced health problems, and Maria increasingly as-
sumed responsibility for his care, eventually moving into his condominium. Id. The following year, 
the testator amended his living trust to grant Maria a life interest in his condominium, and a few 
weeks later, he and Maria remarried. Id. at 521–22. Testator died nine months later. Id. at 522. Maria 
petitioned the court for an omitted-spouse share of the testator’s estate and the testator’s son objected, 
arguing that the testator’s trust amendment was made in contemplation of his remarriage. Id. 
 52 Id. at 525. 
 53 Id. at 523 n.13.  
 54 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012). 
 55 Id. 
 56 See, e.g., Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC v. Sandler, 256 F. App’x 765, 767 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“There is little support for the notion that a prenuptial agreement by itself can satisfy ERISA’s 
spousal-consent requirement.”); Hagwood v. Newton, 282 F.3d 285, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting 
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waives the new spouse’s right to account proceeds, the spouse will be entitled 
to the proceeds on the employee’s death unless the spouse has executed a valid 
waiver.57 
3. Death of a Beneficiary 
All states have intent-effectuating anti-lapse statutes that apply to create 
substitute will beneficiaries when a testator has failed to direct an alternative 
distribution in the event a beneficiary predeceases her.58 The most prevalent 
approach, reflected in UPC section 2-603, is to create a substitute gift in the 
descendants of any predeceased legatees who are descendants of the dece-
dent’s grandparents.59 Thus, if a testator devises her estate in equal shares to 
her three children, and one child predeceases testator leaving surviving de-
scendants, the deceased child’s descendants will take in her stead, unless the 
will expressly directs otherwise by creating an alternative devise. This effectu-
ates the probable intent of most testators. 
The UPC extends parallel protection to non-probate transfers. Section 2-
603 does not itself extend anti-lapse protection to trusts and non-probate trans-
fers.60 Instead, the UPC includes two provisions, one for trusts and another for 
other non-probate transfers, each of which incorporate the survivorship 
framework developed in the UPC’s anti-lapse statute. 
                                                                                                                           
that a prenuptial agreement generally cannot serve as a valid waiver of spousal rights as required by 
ERISA); Nat’l Auto. Dealers & Assocs. Ret. Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Robins v. Geisel, 666 F. Supp. 2d 
463, 467–68 (D.N.J. 2009) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Ross, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073–74 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (same); Zinn v. Donaldson Co., 799 F. Supp. 69, 73 (D. Minn. 1992) (same); Nellis v. 
Boeing Co., No. 91-1011-K, 1992 WL 122773, at *4 (D. Kan. May 8, 1992) (same). 
 57 ERISA requires compliance with a very specific procedure to waive a spouse’s statutory rights: 
the spouse’s waiver must be made after marriage, in a writing that names an alternate beneficiary and 
that is executed in front of a plan representative or notary public. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A). Going 
forward, the spouse must consent to any change of beneficiary designation. Id. By definition, prenup-
tial agreements fail to meet these exacting requirements: they are executed prior to marriage, and 
therefore do not divest a spouse of statutory survivorship rights. In addition, couples may have diffi-
culty complying with ERISA’s exacting timing requirements. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 8, at 195 
n.121. 
 58 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-603 
(West Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (LexisNexis 2011). 
 59 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 241 (2013); see also, e.g., ALA. 
CODE § 43-8-224 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.603 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2603 
(2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-603 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (2007); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 732.603 (West 2010). 
 60 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603, 8 U.L.A. 241, 244 cmt. 
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a. Revocable Trusts 
With respect to trusts, UPC section 2-707 reverses centuries-old common 
law to create a strong presumption that remainder interests are contingent on 
the remainder beneficiary’s surviving to the time of possession, even if the 
trust instrument does not expressly impose such a condition.61 The statute then 
directs—in parallel with the anti-lapse statute—that if a remainder beneficiary 
fails to survive, the trustee must distribute the remainder interest to the surviv-
ing descendants of the predeceased remainder beneficiary.62 
Although several states have adopted section 2-707,63 the statute has gen-
erated much controversy, especially because it reverses centuries-old common 
law rules governing remainder interests in irrevocable trusts.64 But the statute 
is less controversial as it applies to revocable trusts because it appropriately 
aligns the treatment of revocable trusts with wills. To illustrate, compare two 
testators, testator A and testator B. Testator A has a simple will, which devises 
his entire estate to his child. Testator B has a pour-over will and a revocable 
living trust. The will passes testator B’s probate estate to the trustee of his rev-
ocable trust. The revocable trust instrument provides that the trust principal is 
to be distributed at testator B’s death to his child. Suppose both children prede-
cease their father, survived by a spouse and descendants. How will each fa-
ther’s estate be distributed? 
In almost every state, testator A’s bequest to his child will be “saved” by 
an anti-lapse statute, which will designate the child’s (and testator A’s) de-
scendants as the substitute devisees. But under the majority common law rule 
governing trust remainders, testator B’s child’s remainder interest was vested 
(subject to divestment if testator revoked the trust prior to his death).65 Thus, 
testator B’s child’s remainder will be distributed to the child’s residuary will 
beneficiary, who could be someone other than her descendants. If testator B’s 
child died intestate, at least half, if not all, of the property subject to the re-
mainder will be distributed to the child’s husband. But because revocable trusts 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. § 2-707 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 299–302 (2013). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.707 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2707 (2012); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 15-11-707 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-707 (2006); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 633A.4701 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.2713–.2716 (2002 & Supp. 2011); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-717 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-707 (Supp. 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 30.1-09.1-07 (2010). 
 64 See generally, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remain-
ders, 94 MICH. L. REV. 148 (1995); Laura E. Cunningham, The Hazards of Tinkering with the Com-
mon Law of Future Interests: The California Experience, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 667 (1997). 
 65 Alternatively, one could construe the child’s remainder as contingent, with the condition prece-
dent to vesting being that testator B not revoke the trust prior to his death. Either way, at common law 
the remainder would not be contingent on surviving testator B, and would be transmitted through the 
child’s estate. 
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are simply will substitutes, it makes no sense to treat them differently than 
wills. UPC section 2-707 addresses this by authorizing the trustee to distribute 
the trust principal to testator B’s child’s descendants.66 
b. Other Non-Probate Transfers 
Most anti-lapse statutes do not apply to accounts or products with benefi-
ciary designations.67 UPC section 2-706, which has been adopted in several 
states,68 changes that common law rule by extending anti-lapse protection to 
all types of non-probate accounts and insurance policies.69 Under section 2-
706(b), if a beneficiary predeceases the account holder and is a grandparent, 
descendant of a grandparent, or stepchild of the account holder, a substitute 
gift is created in the beneficiary’s surviving descendants, if any.70 For two rea-
sons, however, UPC section 2-706 furnishes inadequate protection against the 
unexpected death of a designated beneficiary. 
First, the comment to section (b)(4) explains that a printed provision in a 
contract directing how an account holder’s estate should be distributed if there 
is no effective beneficiary designation constitutes an “alternate beneficiary 
designation” that preempts application of the statute.71 Many beneficiary des-
ignation forms, life insurance contracts or custodial agreements provide that if 
one primary beneficiary predeceases the account holder, that beneficiary’s 
share will be distributed to other primary beneficiaries. These and similar pro-
visions gut the UPC’s statutory protection.72 If no designated beneficiaries sur-
vive the account holder, then the funds shall be distributed as the contract or 
custodial agreement directs—not as the statute directs. 
Second, the UPC is arguably internally inconsistent with respect to bank 
accounts with POD provisions. Section 6-212 of the UPC, which incorporates 
the Uniform Multiple-Persons Account Act of 1989, provides that on the death 
of the last surviving account holder, “sums on deposit belong to the surviving 
beneficiary or beneficiaries . . . . If no beneficiary survives, sums on deposit 
                                                                                                                           
 66 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 299–302 (2013). 
 67 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-706 (West Supp. 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 75-2-706 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 68 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-706; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-06 (2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-706. 
 69 See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE § 14-2706; COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-706 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 15-15-212 (stating that “[n]either the provisions of section 15-11-706 nor the provisions of any other 
anti-lapse statute apply to the disposition of an account with a POD designation.”); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 560:2-706 (2006) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-706 (Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-706.  
 70 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-706 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 291–94 (2013). 
 71 Id. § 2-706 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 294–95 (2013). 
 72 See infra notes 183–199 and accompanying text.  
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belong to the estate of the last surviving party.”73 Because the comments to this 
section do not cross-reference section 2-706, it is unclear whether the provi-
sion supersedes section 2-706. 
C. The Role of Forms in Selecting Non-Probate Beneficiaries 
Although lawyers sometimes supervise creation of revocable trusts, they do 
not typically supervise the process of filling out a beneficiary designation form. 
Life insurance benefits, POD accounts, and retirement accounts all pass pursuant 
to beneficiary designation forms that are rarely prepared with the assistance of 
lawyers trained to refine and express testator’s objectives. Eliminating lawyers 
obviously reduces the cost of preparing the documents, and one might hope that 
financial intermediaries would develop forms that served as an adequate substi-
tute for the more expensive lawyer-drafted documents tailored to each testator’s 
individual preferences. Unfortunately, the record of those financial intermediar-
ies has been uneven at best. Subsection 1 examines life-insurance beneficiary-
designation forms and their potential to lead policyholders astray when attempt-
ing to change a beneficiary designation.74 Subsection 2 analyzes beneficiary-
designation forms for retirement accounts and suggests that those forms are 
more problematic than the life-insurance beneficiary-designation forms.75  
1. Life-Insurance Beneficiary-Designation Forms 
Examining beneficiary designation forms for seven of the largest U.S. life 
insurers76 reveals that although the forms vary considerably, they share a num-
ber of common problems.  
First, all of the forms but one include critical instructions or sample bene-
ficiary designations on a page separate from the page on which the insured is 
asked to complete beneficiary designations.77 As a result, even an insured with 
                                                                                                                           
 73 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-212(b)(2) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 371 (2013). See generally 
UNIF. MULTIPLE PERS. ACCOUNT ACT (amended 1998). 
 74 See infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 76 MetLife, Prudential, Northwestern Mutual, ING, Lincoln Financial, New York Life, and Hart-
ford Life were the seven largest U.S. life insurers by total life insurance issued in 2010. 2011 Life 
Insurers Fact Book, AMER. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS 109 tbl. 11.12, https://www.acli.com/Tools/
Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact%20Book/Documents/2011%20Fact%20Book.pdf, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/6YAC-U6BP. This Article focuses on change of beneficiary forms rather 
than the forms included in the original policy because change of beneficiary forms were more readily 
available online without applying for a new life insurance policy. There is no reason to believe that a 
firm’s change of beneficiary forms would be materially different from the same firm’s original benefi-
ciary designation forms. The forms are on file with the authors. 
 77 See, e.g., Beneficiary Change for Life Policy, LINCOLN FIN. GRP., https://www.lfg.com/
LincolnPageServer (follow “Beneficiary Change for Life Policy (PDF)” hyperlink), archived at 
https://perma.cc/6YE5-RG8D?type=pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); Life Insurance Change of Benefi-
ciary, METLIFE, https://eforms.metlife.com/wcm8/PDFFiles/31163.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
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the capacity to understand all of her options would have to move back and 
forth from page to page in order to comply with the insurer’s instructions. This 
Article questions whether the ordinary lay purchaser of an insurance policy, a 
purchaser who has identified her spouse or her currently living child or chil-
dren as primary beneficiaries, would take the time to read the often-
complicated instructions with care. 
Second, even if the insured did read all of the directions with care, many 
of the forms make it nearly impossible for an intelligent person to figure out 
how to complete any designation other than one that identifies particular living 
beneficiaries. Consider an insured whose preferences mirror those of many 
testators who write wills: the insured wants the proceeds to pass to her spouse 
if the spouse survives the decedent, and if the spouse does not survive, the in-
sured wants the proceeds to pass to her issue. Providing for “issue” or “de-
scendants” as a class accommodates two preferences shared by most testators: 
the preference to include children born after execution of the policy (without 
the need for amendment), and the preference that, if one of the insured’s chil-
dren predeceases the insured, the deceased child’s descendants will take her 
share, instead of having the share divided up among decedent’s living children. 
How easy would it be for the insured to complete a designation form that ac-
complishes these objectives? 
 Two of the seven forms78 make no provision at all for distribution to a 
class of beneficiaries; the only designations explicitly authorized are designa-
tions of trusts79 or of named individuals. The same two forms make no provi-
sion for the insured to provide for issue of deceased beneficiaries; neither form 
indicates what happens if some, but not all, of the primary beneficiaries prede-
cease the testator. A third form would permit a designation to issue of the in-
sured, and, on the instruction page, includes language that would be effective 
to make the designation—but the language the form suggests for making that 
designation takes up five lines and the designation form has room for only one, 
leaving a reasonable insured scratching her head.80 A fourth form’s instruction 
                                                                                                                           
2AB5-9Z9L (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). The lone exception, Hartford Life, includes virtually no in-
structions with the form. See Change of Beneficiary Request Form, THE HARTFORD, https://forms.
hartfordlife.com/ipsforms/101954HL.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/698A-UAHB (last visited Dec. 
30, 2014). 
 78 Beneficiary Change for Life Policy, LINCOLN FIN. GRP., supra note 77; Change of Beneficiary 
Request Form, THE HARTFORD, supra note 77. 
 79 The Lincoln form has a separate box labeled “Trust Designation.” See Beneficiary Change for 
Life Policy, LINCOLN FIN. GRP., supra note 77. The Hartford form’s instructions indicate that if the 
new “beneficiary is a trust, as copy of the trust document must be submitted and the trust name and 
date must be included as the name in the information box below.” Change of Beneficiary Request 
Form, THE HARTFORD, supra note 77. 
 80 The ING form includes the five lines under a heading “Per Stirpes” at the bottom of a page of 
“Suggested Beneficiary Designations.” See ING, BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION CHANGE REQUEST 
2015] Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System 77 
page provides no instructions for designating beneficiaries, but rather a set of 
“Examples of Beneficiary Designations.”81 Among the examples are two for 
designating “children” as a class, and one for designating named children or 
the children of deceased named children, but the page provides no language for 
making a class gift to issue or descendants. A fifth form’s instruction page pro-
vides the alternative of a designation of “Children of the insured, their children 
by representation,” but instructs the insured to include the designation in the 
“Additional/Special Beneficiary Requests” section.82 To do that, the insured 
would have to leave blank all five sections that ask for various kinds of benefi-
ciary designations—an action that most insureds would find counterintuitive. 
Only two of the seven forms, then, provide a reasonably understandable way 
for a lay insured to designate her issue as beneficiaries—and even those two 
have provisions that will induce most insureds not to designate children or is-
sue as a class as beneficiaries.83 
Statutory or common law rules of construction could correct for benefi-
ciary designation forms that lead policyholders astray. As already noted, the 
rules of construction that are already in place do not generally apply to contract 
dispositions like insurance policies. Even the UPC, which does extend such 
protection, includes a significant loophole by providing that the default clause 
in the policy overcomes the Code’s anti-lapse protection.84 
When life and death events unfold as the insured expects, existing benefi-
ciary designation forms will be more than adequate to accomplish the insured’s 
objectives. In those cases, disputes are unlikely to arise. In cases where life 
events depart from the norm, neither existing forms nor rules of construction 
provide much assurance that the insured’s wishes will be honored. 
2. Retirement Accounts 
The form problem is even worse with retirement accounts. For a variety 
of reasons, the average holder of a retirement account is likely to spend less 
time fretting over beneficiary designations than the average purchaser of a life 
                                                                                                                           
(2014) (on file with author). The form does not explain in laymen’s terms why an insured would want 
to make a “Per Stirpes” designation. Id. 
 81 See Change of Beneficiary, N.Y. LIFE, https://www.vsc3.newyorklife.com/VSCRegWebApp/
formrep/211310911.PDF, archived at https://perma.cc/7U8A-NEDE, (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
 82 See Request to Select/Change Beneficiary, PRUDENTIAL (2014) (on file with author). 
 83 The Metlife form includes the option to include all children, and the option to provide for the issue 
of deceased children, as “Optional Beneficiary Provisions and Requests” to be checked off after the de-
cedent has already listed “Primary Beneficiaries” and “Contingent Beneficiaries.” See Life Insurance 
Change of Beneficiary, METLIFE, supra note 77. The Northwestern Mutual form also asks for named 
beneficiaries and provides that “naming a direct beneficiary is required” before it gives the option to 
include all children of the insured as direct beneficiaries without naming them. See NORTHWESTERN 
MUTUAL, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARIES BY OWNER FOR DEATH PROCEEDS ONLY (2014). 
 84 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-706, cmt. ex. 1 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 331 (2013). 
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insurance policy. First, in many cases, people purchase life insurance with es-
tate planning in mind, and come to the process thinking about beneficiaries 
they want to protect.85 By contrast, people who open IRA or 401(k) accounts 
do so to provide for their own retirement, or to shelter some of their income 
from taxation. Filling out the beneficiary designation form is a necessary evil 
to be completed as quickly as possible. Second, because many retirement ac-
counts are opened when the account holder starts a new job, the account does 
not yet have a significant amount of money, making it less likely that the ac-
count holder will expend effort deciphering beneficiary designation forms. 
Third, many account holders undoubtedly believe (mistakenly) that the benefi-
ciary designation form is unimportant because transmission of retirement as-
sets, like other assets, will ultimately be governed by the terms of a will or 
trust instrument. 
In addition, the forms themselves are less likely than the life insurance 
forms to prompt users to designate beneficiaries in a way that accounts for po-
tential life changes. For instance, most retirement account forms do not give 
account holders the option of providing for the issue of deceased designated 
beneficiaries.86 
Two other factors exacerbate the problem with retirement account forms. 
First, account holders are less likely to update retirement account designations 
than life insurance designations, in part because they may lose track of ac-
counts established with previous employers and in part because they assume 
that the accounts will pass by will. Second, state law cannot operate to protect 
account holders from poorly designed designations on 401(k) and 403(b) ac-
counts, because the Supreme Court has construed ERISA to preempt state law 
with respect to those accounts, and has developed the “plan documents” rule, 
under which the form designations must be treated as conclusive in virtually 
all circumstances.87 The Court has taken the rule so far as to require that a wife 
designated as a beneficiary while married to the account holder take account 
proceeds, despite a subsequent divorce decree that expressly provided that the 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Individual life insurance accounts for fifty-eight percent of all life insurance policies in force in 
the United States in 2012. 2013 Life Insurers Fact Book, AMER. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS 63, 
https://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/Life%20Insurers%20Fact%20Book/Documents/Life_
Insurers_Fact_Book_2013_All.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/BEW6-R3D3. By contrast group life 
insurance, which accounts for thirty-nine percent of life insurance policies in force is often purchased 
in conjunction with acceptance of a position, and the choice of beneficiary on these policies may be 
subject to the same inattention as beneficiary designations associated with retirement accounts. See id. 
at 65. 
 86 See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 8, at 201–04 (providing a more complete account of the defi-
ciencies of retirement account forms).  
 87 See Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 288 (2009). 
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she was “divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to . . . any other 
rights related to any . . . retirement plan.”88 
D. Effectuating the Intent of the Incapacitated Testator 
When a guardian or conservator is appointed to act on behalf of an inca-
pacitated ward, what power does the guardian or conservator have to upset the 
ward’s estate plan? Even when all of the ward’s assets are probate assets, a 
guardian or conservator can exert some influence over distribution of those 
assets, but the potential for distorting the ward’s estate plan increases substan-
tially when the ward has multiple non-probate assets. 
Consider first a world where all of decedent’s assets would pass through 
probate. The guardian is often subject to court supervision89, which prevents 
some acts that would constitute an abuse of the guardian’s power. In some 
states, the guardian could nevertheless affect the disposition of specifically 
devised property by transferring that property before the decedent’s death.90 In 
most states, however, including those that have adopted the UPC, the benefi-
ciary of the specific devise might receive the value of that property even if the 
property was no longer in the decedent’s estate.91 And with respect to property 
not specifically devised, even if the guardian spent money to meet the ward’s 
needs, the statutory abatement scheme would determine which beneficiaries 
would see their shares reduced as the size of the ward’s fortune dwindled.92 
When decedent has both probate and non-probate assets, the guardian or 
conservator has expanded power to affect the disposition of the ward’s estate 
by deciding which assets the ward consumes during his lifetime, and, perhaps, 
by revoking or modifying the ward’s non-probate dispositions. 
 Consider the facts of Estate of Strang v. Strang, where, in 2004, the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio considered whether a guardian’s actions amounted to 
misconduct.93 At the time the decedent’s daughter was appointed as his guardi-
an, the decedent had a certificate of deposit (“CD”) at a local bank, payable on 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. at 289. 
 89 See Karen E. Boxx & Terry W. Hammond, A Call for Standards: An Overview of the Current 
Status and Need for Guardian Standards of Conduct and Codes of Ethics, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1207, 
1235. 
 90 See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenamyre, 219 S.W.3d 877, 883, 887 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (hold-
ing that specific bequest was adeemed, leaving devisee without any right to proceeds, when conserva-
tor transferred property before testator’s death). The Greenamyre court noted that the UPC, subse-
quently adopted in Tennessee, was not applicable retroactively. Id. 
 91 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(b) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 263 (2013); see also, e.g., In 
re Estate of Mason, 397 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Cal. 1965); Brown v. Labow, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 419 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Many states also hold that property transferred pursuant to a power of attorney is not 
adeemed if the transfer is made after an adjudication of incapacity. See Rodgers v. Rodgers, 406 
S.W.3d 422, 423 (Ark. 2012); In re Estate of Anton, 731 N.W.2d 19, 28 (Iowa 2007). 
 92 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-902 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 347–48 (2013). 
 93 No. 03-COA-071, 2004 WL 1549685, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 2004). 
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death to his son.94 The guardian-daughter and two other daughters were resid-
ual beneficiaries under the decedent’s will.95 First, was the guardian entitled to, 
or obligated to, pay for the decedent’s living expenses out of the CD? Note that 
if the guardian paid living expenses out of the CD, the ward’s daughters bene-
fited at the expense of the son, while if the guardian paid the same expenses 
out of probate assets, the son benefited at the expense of the daughter.  
Second, was the guardian entitled to revoke the POD designation, or, 
when the CD matured, was the guardian required to renew the CD with the 
same designation? Again, the guardian’s decision could have a significant im-
pact on the ultimate distribution of the decedent’s assets. 
Estate of Strang generated three separate opinions. The guardian-daughter 
had, in fact, renewed the CD, but deleted the designation of her brother as 
POD beneficiary.96 The opinion for the court held that at the time of the ward’s 
death, the CD funds were estate assets, reasoning that following the finding of 
incompetency, the guardian obtained ownership rights to the ward’s estate, in-
cluding the right to designate a change in account registration.97 A concurring 
opinion argued that, in reviewing the guardian’s action, the court was required 
to consider the effect of the guardian’s action on the ward’s estate plan.98 On 
the facts of the case, the concurring justice concluded that the trial court had 
not abused its discretion in finding no misconduct by the guardian, suggesting 
that failure to renew the POD account was somehow different from cancelling 
an existing POD account.99 A dissenting opinion concluded that the guardian 
should have no authority to interfere with a ward’s testamentary disposition, 
and would have held that the guardian had authority to withdraw funds from 
the POD account only if needed to support the ward during his lifetime.100 Be-
cause it was conceded that the funds were not needed for that purpose, the dis-
senting judge would have invalidated the guardian’s action.101 
The law on the issues raised in Estate of Strang remains unsettled. The 
opinion for the court would appear to authorize a guardian or conservator to 
choose which non-probate assets should be used for the ward’s needs without 
regard to the effect of that decision on the estate plan the ward had developed 
while competent. Moreover, nothing in that opinion would limit the guardian’s 
power to transfer assets in and out of various non-probate accounts, even if the 
transfers were not necessary to support the ward during the ward’s lifetime. If 
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 95 Id. 
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 97 Id. at *2. 
 98 Id. at *3–4 (Wise, J., concurring). 
 99 Id. at *4. 
 100 Id. (Gwin, J., dissenting). 
 101 Id. 
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that view were to prevail, a self-interested guardian would have significant 
power to alter the ward’s estate plan. 
The opinion for the court in Estate of Strang appears to authorize a guard-
ian not merely to move funds into or out of non-probate accounts, but also to 
revoke or modify a beneficiary designation on one of those accounts.102 Sec-
tion 5-407 of the UPC authorizes a court “directly or through a conservator” to 
“create revocable or irrevocable trusts of property of the estate which may ex-
tend beyond the disability or life of the protected person.”103 Although the 
UPC does not directly address the problem in Estate of Strang, a number of 
courts have construed their statutes to permit judicial modification of revoca-
ble trusts (generally on petition of a guardian or conservator).104 By contrast, at 
least one court has held that once a guardian is appointed because of settlor’s 
incapacity, a revocable trust created by the ward becomes irrevocable.105 
Legal doctrine on this point remains in a state of flux, which leaves consid-
erable potential that a testator’s carefully framed estate plan could be undone if 
and when testator loses capacity and requires appointment of a guardian or con-
servator. Although breach of fiduciary duty claims might ultimately be available 
against a self-interested guardian or conservator, the cost of litigating those 
claims is a byproduct of the expanded use of non-probate transfers. 
II. COORDINATING FRAGMENTED ASSETS 
Even if legal doctrine were reconstructed to increase the likelihood that 
each individual document in decedent’s estate plan reflected the intent of the 
decedent, a problem would remain. The collection of documents that make up 
the estate plan, often executed at different times and under different circum-
stances, generates inconsistencies that would not arise if decedent’s estate plan 
were reflected in a single instrument. This Part explores the coordination prob-
lems that arise when a decedent’s estate is fragmented among a probate estate 
and a variety of non-probate transfers. Section A discusses the coordination 
that is required for proper planning during the settlor’s or account holder’s 
life.106 Section B analyzes issues related to the coordination of assets after the 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See id. at *1 (majority opinion). 
 103 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-407(b)(3) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 209 (2013); see also, e.g., 755 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11a-18(a-5)(11) (2012) (giving Illinois probate courts the power to modify the 
terms of any revocable trust created by a person under guardianship). 
 104 See, e.g., In re Estate of Michalak, 934 N.E.2d 697, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (authorizing 
guardian to amend revocable trust created before ward was adjudicated an incompetent); In re Guardi-
anship & Conservatorship of Garcia, 631 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Neb. 2001) (upholding statutory power of 
courts to modify, but finding no clear and convincing evidence to grant the conservator leave to 
amend, modify, or revoke the trust). 
 105 In re Guardianship of Lee, 982 P.2d 539, 541 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999). 
 106 See infra notes 108–195 and accompanying text. 
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testator’s death, such as the estate tax liability, creditor claims against the es-
tate, and apportionment of the estate’s liabilities.107  
A. Coordination During the Life of the Settlor or Account Holder 
When a decedent’s estate plan involves only a will, the procedure for 
changing the estate plan is simple—return to a lawyer who will draft a codicil 
or a new will. Estate planning, even for modest estates, has become more 
complex. When a client has a revocable living trust, and/or one or more ac-
counts or insurance policies that include beneficiary designations, attorneys 
must ensure that these vehicles are coordinated to form one coherent estate 
plan. Because many clients have multiple non-probate accounts, attorneys 
must do far more than draft and supervise the execution of a will. Now, the 
attorney must ensure that the client identifies all existing non-probate accounts 
and properly amends or revokes them, if necessary. 
To complicate matters, the law governing non-probate transfers has be-
come more complex, which can generate additional confusion for the less-
than-diligent lawyer.108 Within states, the rules applicable to beneficiary desig-
nations for accounts governed by state law differ depending on the nature of 
the non-probate asset.109 In addition, recent state law changes reverse long-
standing common law doctrines. Finally, certain non-probate assets are gov-
erned by federal law, which preempts, and is often inconsistent with, state 
law.110 The complexity of the law makes it more likely that lawyers without 
extensive training in the nuances of estate planning will make mistakes.  
Finally, it has become popular wisdom that revocable trusts are a neces-
sary staple of every estate plan. This has facilitated a market for cheap revoca-
ble trusts, which non-attorneys are only too happy to provide. These form 
trusts often lead to litigation, even when lawyers provide ostensible supervi-
sion while, in fact, acting as little more than expediters for so-called “trust 
mills.” 
Putting lawyer error aside, there are limits to what even the most diligent 
lawyer can do to ensure that the client dies with an integrated estate plan in 
place. The non-probate revolution has created opportunities for clients to dis-
turb their estate plans outside the watchful gaze of their attorneys. For one 
thing, clients may fail to give an accurate list of their non-probate assets to 
their attorneys. Once the client’s estate plan is in place, the client may acquire 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See infra notes 196–273 and accompanying text. 
 108 See, e.g., In re Brown, O.C. No. 1435 IV of 2003, 2005 WL 3753142, at *1 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 
29, 2005) (exemplifying the complexity of the rules, and challenges the rules present to lawyers, in a 
case where an attorney attempted to assign all non-probate assets to a client’s trust, but failed to do so 
because he did not comply with individual institution’s change-of-beneficiary requirements). 
 109 See infra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 110 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (providing that ERISA preempts state law). 
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new non-probate accounts, or may attempt to change beneficiary designations 
on old ones without attorney supervision. Because the beneficiary designation 
forms provided by financial institutions can produce counter-intuitive results, 
account holders’ assets can pass in ways the account holder did not anticipate. 
The following sections elaborate on these points.111  
1. Increased Opportunities for Attorney Error 
a. Procedure is More Complicated 
When a client has multiple non-probate assets, the opportunities for attor-
ney error multiply as well. It is critical that estate planners obtain thorough and 
accurate lists of the client’s non-probate mechanisms, and that he or she follow 
the correct procedure for changing the beneficiary designation for each one. 
For example, in In re Brown,112 the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania 
considered a case where an attorney’s attempt to “simplify” his client’s estate 
plan backfired. Charlie Mae Moore Brown summoned an attorney to the hospi-
tal bed where she lay dying.113 The attorney failed to obtain from the client a 
thorough accounting of her numerous non-probate assets.114 Instead, he created 
a revocable living trust and a document titled “assignment,” which purported 
to convey to the revocable trust all of Brown’s “right, title and interest in and 
to assets of every kind,” including “all ‘policies’ of every kind . . . regardless 
of whether the form of beneficiary designation otherwise required by the payor 
of such benefits is executed by me at any time after the date of this Assign-
ment.”115 Three days after Brown signed the documents, the attorney sent her a 
letter stating that “many of the assets” required additional “documentation,” 
and that the attorney intended to “procure the appropriate change of benefi-
ciary forms from the insurance company and/or payors of retirement bene-
fits.”116 The attorney then left for vacation, and Brown died.117  
The successor trustee of the new revocable trust claimed ownership of 
Brown’s joint bank accounts, life insurance policies, IRA account, 403(b) re-
tirement account, and pension.118 After two years of litigation, the court deter-
mined that the assignment did not transfer Brown’s non-probate assets to the 
trust because Brown had made no attempt to comply with each institution’s 
procedures for changing a beneficiary designation.119 Thus, “the failure of ei-
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ther the decedent or her attorney to track down her considerable assets, check 
the relevant documentation and execute change of beneficiary forms”120 result-
ed in costly litigation and an almost total defeat of testator’s estate plan. 
b. The Law Is More Complicated 
Ideally, attorneys would always ensure that the client executes the appro-
priate change of beneficiary form supplied by the financial institution holding 
the account. Unfortunately, attorneys can fail to follow this procedure. Instead, 
they might attempt to change beneficiary designations through provisions in 
other documents: wills, revocable trusts, divorce settlements, or prenuptial 
agreements. These attempts often generate litigation, and frequently result in 
the frustration of the account holder’s intent.  
Although it is tempting to attribute this to simple attorney negligence, it is 
important to note that beneficiary designations on some types of accounts can 
be changed using these various methods. The law surrounding this issue is un-
wieldy and complex, which can generate confusion for the less-than-diligent 
lawyer. This complexity has three components. First, state law rules regarding 
beneficiary designation changes differ within states depending on the nature of 
the asset. For example, in Washington, a revocable trust or POD account may 
be revoked or amended by a provision in the account holder’s will,121 while a 
beneficiary designation in an IRA or life insurance policy cannot.122  
Second, some state rules are relatively new, and reverse long-standing 
common law doctrine. For example, UPC section 6-213 reverses more than a 
century of well-established law that permits revocation of Totten trust bank 
accounts by any act that manifests an intent to revoke, including oral or written 
statements or a provision in the account holder’s will.123  
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at *1. 
 121 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.11.020 (West 2012) (providing that beneficiary designa-
tions on non-probate assets can be changed by will); id. § 11.11.010 (failing to exclude POD accounts 
or revocable trusts from the category of non-probate assets that can be revoked by will). 
 122 See id.§ 11.02.005 (excluding life insurance policies from the definition of non-probate as-
sets); id. § 11.11.010 (excluding IRAs from the category of non-probate assets with beneficiary desig-
nations that can be changed by will). 
 123 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 
(2003) (providing examples of cases where courts have considered the application of wills doctrine to 
will substitutes); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 26 cmt. c (2003); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. c (1959); William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Revocation of Tenative 
(“Totten”) Trust of Savings Bank Account by Inter Vivos Declaration or Will, 46 A.L.R.3d 487 (1972) 
(stating that “[v]irtually all courts adopting the Totten trust doctrine adhere to [the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trust’s] liberal policy and recognize that a Totten trust is effectively revoked where some 
declaration of the depositor, regardless of form, and regardless of whether made inter vivos or in a 
will, sufficiently expresses or implies the existence of a revocatory intent”). The UPC provides that a 
savings account POD designation can be changed only by written notice delivered to the bank during 
the account holder’s lifetime. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-213 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 373 (2013). 
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Third, ERISA’s preemption provision adds another layer of complication, 
because beneficiary designations attached to employer-provided accounts can 
never be changed by provisions in documents other than change of beneficiary 
designation forms.124 Each of these doctrinal wrinkles generates confusion for 
the generalist attorney.  
Perhaps the most common lawyer error is the attempt to change benefi-
ciary designations through will or trust provisions. Until recently, it was quite 
clear that Totten trusts could be revoked or changed in this way—in fact, for 
more than a century of common law doctrine had instructed that Totten trusts 
can be revoked or amended by any method that manifests clear and convincing 
evidence of intent.125 An attorney aware of this rule might assume that a will 
executed after the establishment of Totten trusts will simply operate to revoke 
the trusts. He or she might also assume that the rule is the same for other types 
of non-probate assets, such as IRAs, 401Ks, or life insurance policies. Both 
assumptions will lead to costly litigation. 
For example, in Araiza v. Younkin,126 an attorney had created a 2005 rev-
ocable living trust and listed the settlor’s bank account, which named a payable 
on death beneficiary, as a trust asset, despite the fact that the California legisla-
ture had reversed the common law rule by statute more than a decade before. 
California Probate Code section 5303 provides that an account holder can 
change a beneficiary designation by only one of three methods: closing the 
account and reopening it under different terms, delivering a writing to the 
bank, or complying with the financial institution’s own instructions.127 Alt-
hough the court strained to give effect to the account holder’s intent, the litiga-
tion itself was the costly product of lawyer error.128  
Similarly, in Estate of Taylor,129 a lawyer attempted to change a divorcing 
client’s IRA beneficiary designations through a provision in the client’s will. 
Testator had several pre-existing nonprobate accounts, including an IRA that 
                                                                                                                           
 124 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 125 See, e.g., In re Rodgers’ Estate, 97 A.2d 789, 792 (Pa. 1953) (a will that did not refer to testa-
tor’s Totten trusts nevertheless operated to revoke those trusts, when considered in light of surround-
ing circumstances); Parks’ Ex’rs v. Parks, 156 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Ky. 1941) (holding that will provi-
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despite his attorney’s testimony that his client intended to leave everything to his son); Suga v. Suga, 
182 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (finding that clear will provision changing beneficiary from 
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 126 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 317 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 127 Id. at 318–19; see CAL. PROB. CODE § 5303 (West 2009). 
 128 See Araiza, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 320. 
 129 2010 WL5464751 at *1. 
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named his brother and sister as death beneficiaries.130 The will’s residuary 
clause created a testamentary trust to benefit his minor son.131 The will provid-
ed that “the Trust shall include all my monies and properties . . . from my 
Charles Schwab accounts (Schwab IRA’s, Schwab One, etc.) . . . .”132 After the 
testator died in a boating accident, his executor claimed that the IRA was prop-
erty of the testamentary trust.133 Although the court noted that there “certainly 
is strong evidence of William's intent to leave the Schwab IRA to his son,” be-
cause he had taken no steps to comply with Schwab’s procedure for changing 
the designation, the IRA would be distributed to the named beneficiaries.134 
These problems would be minimized if statutes authorized courts to take 
the same approach that they take when an attorney botches a will execution. In 
states that have adopted UPC section 2-503, courts may overlook failure to 
comply with will formalities, as long as there is clear and convincing evidence 
that the testator intended the document to serve as her will.135 The trend in 
wills law is to admit wills to probate when intent is clear. This rescues the cli-
ent with the poor attorney.  
Nevertheless, section 2-503 applies only to wills, and the UPC contains 
no spiritual twin that would forgive botched attempts to coordinate assets. Alt-
hough courts are often willing to resort to the “substantial compliance” doc-
trine,136 the doctrine has limited utility, because it can be invoked only in a nar-
row category of cases—where an account holder or settlor has attempted to 
comply with a financial institution or trust’s procedural rules. It does not give 
courts broad authority to effectuate intent in other cases, even if the account 
holder or settlor’s failure is attributable to attorney error.  
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interest in any non-probate asset specifically referred to in the owner's will belongs to the testamentary 
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 135 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 350 (2013); see, e.g., In re Hall, 51 
P.3d 1134, 1136 (Mont. 2002); In re Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
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to change the beneficiary from his ex-wife to his son even though employee failed to provide son’s 
social security number as required by the form); Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, No. 3:10CV00538 
(DJS), 2012 WL 1068978, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2012); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Einhorrn, 676 
F. Supp. 2d 116, 135–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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Divorce presents another opportunity for lawyer error. With some fre-
quency, divorcing parties fail to consult estate-planning attorneys in conjunc-
tion with the divorce, leaving questions about distribution of property to their 
divorce attorneys. If the cases are any indication, a fair number of those attor-
neys either are insufficiently versed in estates law and ERISA’s plan docu-
ments rule or view estate planning issues as outside the scope of representa-
tion. As a result, the lawyers may express their clients’ intent in their property 
settlement agreements or divorce decrees, but may fail to change beneficiary 
designation forms. In states that have not adopted a version of UPC section 2-
804, a provision in a divorce decree will operate to revoke a beneficiary desig-
nation only if a court determines that the language in the divorce decree is suf-
ficiently precise.137 The cases are inconsistent, and it is difficult to predict 
whether a court will find the language to be sufficiently precise to constitute a 
waiver.138 
ERISA’s preemption rules compound the opportunity for error by general-
ist lawyers. In Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Invest-
ment Plan, 139 the employee’s divorce lawyer made sure that the divorce decree 
expressly provided that his ex-wife was “divested of all right, title, interest, 
and claim in and to . . . any other rights related to any . . . retirement plan, pen-
sion plan, or like benefit program” existing by reason of the employee’s pre-
sent or future employment.140 Despite this fairly clear provision, the Supreme 
Court held that the plan documents controlled, and that the plan administrator 
had properly distributed the account balance to the ex-wife.141  
Another opportunity for lawyer error arises when a lawyer drafts a pre-
nuptial agreement for a client with ERISA-governed retirement accounts. Re-
call that ERISA provides that upon marriage, a spouse obtains a legal right to 
some or all of the account holder’s retirement account.142 A typical prenuptial 
agreement will be ineffective to divest the new spouse of this right, because a 
waiver is effective only if the spouse executes it after marriage, in the pres-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 647 N.W.2d 85, 89, 90 (Neb. 2002) (determining 
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ence of a notary or plan representative.143 The spouse must thereafter consent 
to any change of beneficiary designation.144 If the client’s lawyer does not 
know that, the client’s intent might be frustrated. 
Yet another problem of lawyer error arises not merely from inadequate 
knowledge about the changing legal landscape, but from conflict of interest. 
Savvy financial planners have harnessed the energy of the non-probate revolu-
tion and often include revocable trusts in the package of services they sell. The 
disciplinary cases indicate that some of these individuals create “trust mills” 
that aggressively sell living trust forms as something that is necessary for eve-
ryone. 145 To avoid the charge that they are practicing law without a license, 
these individuals include a lawyer or two on their team. These lawyers place 
themselves in a conflict of interest position, because it is against their financial 
self-interest to recommend against a living trust. Worse, some function as rub-
ber stamps instead of rendering meaningful legal advice and consultation. As a 
result, settlors often execute trust documents that they do not understand and 
that do not accomplish their purposes. 
McGovern v. Bigelow146 provides an astonishing example. After Jean Bi-
gelow was diagnosed with leukemia, she and Ed, her husband of forty-five 
years, paid a fifteen-minute visit to a non-lawyer employee of a “trust services 
institution,” who sold them a revocable living trust.147 Because their goals 
were to avoid probate and ensure that their assets were distributed to their chil-
dren, the trust agreement should have provided that the trust would become 
irrevocable at the death of the first spouse.148 Instead, the trust provided that at 
the death of the first spouse, “the designation of beneficiaries or specific gifts 
in the Trusts created by this Declaration shall become irrevocable and not sub-
ject to amendment or modification.”149 Neither the employee nor the attorney 
who oversaw the Bigelows’ execution of the trust document discussed this 
revocability issue with the Bigelows.150 The attorney, who was retained by the 
trust company, had never prepared a living trust, and he offered no legal ad-
vice—he simply notarized the settlors’ signatures on the documents.151  
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 145 See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Sharp Estate Serv. Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1183, 1185–86 (Ohio 
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The result was a disaster for the Bigelow children. Ed remarried, and re-
voked the trust.152 The California appellate court upheld the revocation, because 
the trust document—an admittedly “poorly drafted hodgepodge” of “boilerplate 
provisions”—did not provide that the trust itself would become irrevocable at the 
death of the first spouse.153 The Bigelow children paid the price for their parents’ 
failure to consult with competent and independent counsel.  
2. The Limits of Attorney Control 
Even the most diligent lawyer cannot ensure that a client will die with an 
integrated estate plan in place. Clients may forget about non-probate assets, 
preventing the attorney from crafting an integrated plan. After an estate plan is 
established, the client might “go rogue” and change beneficiary designations or 
acquire new accounts without consulting the attorney. These acts often result in 
litigation that drains value from the estate. Point (a) provides an example of the 
harm that can result from a client’s failure to inform his attorney of non-
probate assets.154 Point (b) highlights the consequences of a client inde-
pendently opening new accounts or attempting to change beneficiary designa-
tions once an established estate plan is in place.155 Point (c) discusses cases in 
which a testator or account holder failed to understand the revocation require-
ments for a non-probate asset, which is a common problem due to the precise 
procedures required by institutions.156  
a. Clients Fail to Inform Attorneys of Non-Probate Assets 
Clients often fail to inform their attorneys about pre-existing non-probate 
assets. For example, in Midwest Trust Company v. Ong, the settlor had pur-
ported to transfer her home to a new trust.157 Unfortunately, her attorney was 
unaware that she had transferred the home to a previous joint trust more than 
twenty years before.158 As a result, the attorney did not have the settlor execute 
an instrument of revocation (as required by the first trust), and he allowed her 
to execute a deed that identified her as grantor in her personal capacity instead 
of as the settlor of the previous trust.159 Noting that the first trust’s terms re-
quired revocation to be accomplished only by the settlor’s delivering of a writ-
ing to the trustee, the court determined that settlor’s execution of the second 
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 154 See infra notes 157–161 and accompanying text. 
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 157 See No. 106,744, 2013 WL 310353, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013). 
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trust document and deed did not operate to remove the home from the first 
trust.160 The court emphasized that “the requirements for revocation or modifi-
cation were lacking because she never specified that she was acting in her ca-
pacity as grantor of the 1983 Trust when she executed the warranty deed.”161 
b. After an Estate Plan has Been Put in Place, Clients Obtain New Accounts 
or Change Beneficiary Designations on Old Ones Without Consulting an 
Attorney 
One consequence of the non-probate revolution is that clients must visit 
their estate planners more frequently than before. Because many of the rules of 
construction applicable to wills law do not extend to non-probate assets, clients 
who open new non-probate account without attorney consultation threaten to 
wreak havoc with their estate plans. 
Reconsider Estate of Taylor, where a testator created a testamentary trust 
for his minor son and attempted to transfer his non-probate assets to the trust.162 
The testator named his brother Charles as the executor and trustee, and his father 
Reuben as alternative trustee.163 Months after the testator executed his will, and 
without his attorney’s knowledge, the testator changed the beneficiary of his life 
insurance policies to his father Reuben, and the beneficiary designation on an 
IRA to his brother Charles (naming his father as alternative beneficiary).164 
Thereafter, he took out three new life insurances policies through his employer, 
and designated his brother Charles as the beneficiary and father Reuben as con-
tingent beneficiary.165 The appellate court held that compelling evidence that 
Taylor intended to provide for his minor son created a triable issue of fact as to 
whether he intended to name his father and brother as beneficiaries in their own 
right, or in their capacity as trustee and alternative trustee of the testamentary 
trust.166 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for trial.167 
c. Settlors or Account Holders Misunderstand Revocation Requirements  
Many non-probate instruments specify precise procedures for revoking 
dispositions. Settlors or account holders, however, frequently misunderstand or 
ignore those procedures, resulting in litigation, and sometimes, in frustration of 
the estate plan. 
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With respect to POD accounts, depositors frequently ignore statutory re-
quirements that the bank receive a signed writing changing the designated 
POD beneficiary. For example, in Jordan v. Burgbacher, an account holder had 
called the bank and asked the employee to remove his ex-wife’s name as the 
payable-on-death beneficiary of a bank account.168 The evidence suggests that 
the employee did so, because the ex-wife’s name was not listed on the account 
statements going forward.169 There was also evidence that the account holder 
sent a follow-up letter confirming the change, but the bank had no record of 
receiving such a letter.170 In awarding the ex-wife the account proceeds, the 
court emphasized that “[t]he question whether the account holder intended or 
attempted to communicate an account change order to the bank is not material 
under [Arizona Revised Statute] section 14-6105. It is the receipt of the written 
order by the bank that is material.”171 
In Jordan, and in other cases, the result is frustration of the depositor’s in-
tent.172 In other cases, even if courts honor the depositor’s change, that result 
would be achieved only after litigation dissipates the depositor’s assets.173  
When a settlor creates a revocable trust and names herself as trustee, she 
may see even less reason to worry about the formalities needed to revoke the 
trust. And, ordinarily, few formalities are required. The common law, and Uni-
form Trust Code (UTC) section 602, which largely restates it, gives courts 
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account); In re Wolfinger, 793 P.2d 393, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (determining that account holder’s 
oral request to remove daughter’s name from his bank account was ineffective, because compliance 
with Utah’s multi-party account statute was mandatory). 
 173 See, e.g., West Greeley Nat’l Bank v. Wygant, 650 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Colo. App. 1982) (hon-
oring a change of POD beneficiary made when a bank employee, at the request of the depositor, simp-
ly crossed out the old beneficiary’s name and inserted the name of depositor’s new wife). 
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wide leeway to effectuate settlors’ intentions.174 Section 602 provides that a 
settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust by substantially complying with 
the trust instrument’s requirements for amendment or revocation, or, if the trust 
instrument is silent, by any method that manifests clear and convincing evi-
dence of intent.175 
Problems arise, however, when the trust instrument includes a procedure 
for revoking or amending trust provisions, usually designed to reduce the pos-
sibility of litigation at the settlor’s death. Unfortunately, settlors frequently dis-
regard these directives, and attempt to revoke trusts through their informal 
writings176 or wills.177 When this occurs, courts vary in their willingness to 
effectuate intent. For example, in In re Estate of McCreath,178 the Colorado 
Court of Appeals considered a case where the settlor had named herself and 
her daughter as co-trustees of a trust into which she transferred real property. 
The trust instrument instructed that only a writing delivered to the trustees 
could revoke it.179 The settlor later executed a will purporting to revoke the 
trust and showed the will to her daughter.180 Nevertheless, the court determined 
that a “will” was not an “instrument” within the meaning of the trust, because 
it did not become operative until the testator’s death.181 In so holding, the court 
emphasized that “[i]f a trust agreement provides a specific method for revoca-
tion, that method must be strictly adhered to in order [to] revoke the trust.”182 
Because revocable trust settlors often treat trust assets as their own, litiga-
tion issues arise when they attempt to transfer trust property. First, is the trans-
fer effective at all if the settlor does not identify herself as trustee of the trust? 
For example, in McCreath, the settlor also executed a quitclaim deed from her-
                                                                                                                           
 174 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c) (amended 2010). 
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 178 240 P.3d 413, 416 (Colo. App. 2009). 
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 181 Id. at 421. 
 182 Id. at 418. 
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self “as trustee” to her daughter.183 The court affirmed the trial court’s determi-
nation that the deed was ineffective to transfer ownership: because the mother 
was the settlor, she did not “own” the trust estate, and because she was co-
trustee, she could not transfer title without acting jointly with the co-trustee 
(her daughter, to whom she conveyed the trust property).184 
Second, if the transfer itself was effective, did the transfer revoke the 
trust, or are the assets the settlor received in return still subject to the trust? In 
Heaps v. Heaps, a husband and wife had transferred the title to their home to a 
joint revocable trust, but neglected to record the deed.185 They later sold the 
home, taking a note in the names of “George and Barbara Heaps as joint ten-
ants.”186 After Barbara’s death, George transferred the note to a new revocable 
trust he created with his second wife.187 At George’s death, his second wife 
claimed ownership of the note, arguing that the point of the revocable trust was 
to enable the settlor to deal with his assets easily while avoiding probate.188 
George’s children with Barbara argued that the note was property of the first 
trust, and the court agreed, relying on two trust provisions: the first allowed 
revocation only by a instrument of revocation delivered to the trustee; the sec-
ond stated that trust property would remain trust property regardless of how 
title was taken.189  
Cases like McCreath and Heaps indicate that settlors do not understand 
the consequences of holding property in a revocable trust, and their failure to 
understand makes it difficult to determine what their transactions were de-
signed to accomplish, thereby threatening the integrity of their estate plans. 
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding about revocation is the com-
monsense and intuitive belief that one can revoke a non-probate transfer by 
will. This belief has upset many an estate plan. Although a number of states do 
allow an explicit provision in a will to revoke some non-probate transfers, stat-
utes in other states preclude that result. UPC section 6-213 prohibits changes in 
POD designations by will or trust, and many courts have been reluctant to hold 
that a depositor’s trust agreement or will can alter a POD designation.190 Most 
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states do not allow life insurance policy191 or IRA beneficiary designations192 
to be revoked by will. This is a case, then, where the law is inconsistent with 
lay expectations. Because the non-probate system relies less heavily on legal 
advice than does the probate system, non-probate transfers present a greater 
risk of frustrating intention. 
To compound the problem, many courts have refused to take a substantial 
compliance approach when a settlor or account holder attempts to revoke a trust 
or beneficiary designation. Although UTC section 602 directs courts to adopt a 
substantial compliance approach in determining whether a revocable trust settlor 
has complied with the trust’s instructions for revocation,193 many courts insist 
that the settlor strictly adhere to the procedure set forth in the trust instrument.194 
Some states have recently adopted rather rigid statutory requirements for amend-
ing or revoking all revocable trusts.195 With respect to POD accounts, the trend 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 32.4 (1992); Wanda 
Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Effectiveness of Change of Named Beneficiary of Life or Accident In-
surance Policy By Will, 25 A.L.R. 4th 1164 (1983); Parks Ex'rs, 444 156 S.W.2d at 485 (holding that 
will provision was ineffective to change beneficiary because a contrary rule “would be perilous to all 
insurance companies”); Suga, 182 N.E.2d at 924 (finding that clear will provision changing benefi-
ciary from wife to son was ineffective); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. MacBrair, 31 N.E.2d 172, 173, 
174 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940) (holding that insured’s act of signing a writing with instructions to add a 
beneficiary, having a witness sign the document, attaching the document to the life insurance policy 
and keeping it in a locked box was insufficient to change the designation). But see Allen v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Fort Smith, 547 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Ark. 1977) (recognizing that a will provision clearly iden-
tifying the insurance policy can be effective to change the beneficiary); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Peterson, 442 F.Supp. 533, 537 (W.D. Mo.1978) (giving effect to will provision changing life insur-
ance beneficiary designation to effectuate intent). 
 192 See, e.g., In re Estate of Taylor, No. 63761-4-1, 2010 WL 5464751, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Dec. 20, 2010); McCarthy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 704 N.E.2d 557, 559 (N.Y. 1998); Sterk & Leslie, 
supra note 8, at 192–93 (collecting cases). 
 193 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 (amended 2010). 
 194 See, e.g., McCreath, 240 P.3d at 418 (holding that a will provision ordering revocation of a 
trust did not comply with trust’s instructions for revocation); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Minneapolis, 262 N.W.2d 403, 405, 406 (Minn. 1977) (same); In re Estate of Sanders, 929 
P.2d 153, 162 (Kan. 1996) (same); In re Estate of Kovalyshyn, 343 A.2d 852, 857 (Hudson County 
Ct. 1975) (same). 
 195 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 19-3B-602 (2007) (curiously, providing that a revocable trust can be 
revoked by any method, except that a “written” revocable trust can be revoked only by a later writing 
that is delivered to the trustee); ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.340 (2012) (allowing revocation only by a 
writing signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee during the settlor’s lifetime, unless the trust 
otherwise provides); CAL. PROB. CODE § 15401 (West Supp. 2014) (providing that a trust may be 
revoked by complying with the process set forth in the trust or, if that process is not exclusive or if the 
trust is silent, by a writing, other than a will, signed by the settlor or other person holding the power of 
revocation and delivered to the trustee); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 7-1.16–.17 (McKinney 
Supp. 2014) (allowing revocation only by a writing that complies with formalities or an express provi-
sion in testator’s will); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7752(c)(2) (2010) (directing that a trust can be revoked 
“by a later writing, other than a will or codicil, that is signed by the settlor and expressly refers to the 
trust or specifically conveys property that would otherwise have passed according to the trust instru-
ment”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-38-602 (2013) (providing that a trust can be revoked by a writing 
delivered to the trustee that manifests clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent); WASH. 
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is toward replacing intent-effectuating approaches with black letter rules that 
prioritize administrative efficiency. Many courts have interpreted UPC section 6-
213 as overturning common law to set forth the exclusive procedure for chang-
ing a POD designation. And, of course, the Supreme Court’s ERISA decisions 
ensure that account holders’ intentions will be frustrated in a broad swath of cas-
es.  
B. Coordination of Assets After Death 
Fragmentation of decedent’s assets—a consequence of the non-probate 
revolution—generates a related set of problems after the decedent’s death. 
First, who is liable for federal and estate taxes? Second, against which assets 
do creditors have claims? Third, who is responsible for coordinating assets to 
make sure that liability for taxes and debts is allocated appropriately? As Pro-
fessor Langbein cautioned, lawyer-drafters must anticipate these problems be-
fore death.196 The evidence, however, suggests that many lawyers are having 
difficulty navigating the system—in part because of doctrinal confusion that 
remains even thirty years after publication of Langbein’s article. Subsection 1 
examines the liability for estate taxes both when the governing instruments are 
silent and when one or more of the governing instruments address estate tax 
liability.197 Subsection 2 examines the liability of non-probate beneficiaries for 
decedent’s debts and estate expenses.198 Subsection 3 explores absence of clear 
responsibility for coordinating estate assets and liabilities in situations where 
there are both probate and non-probate assets.199  
1. Liability for Estate Taxes 
For federal estate tax purposes (and for state estate-tax purposes in at least 
some states), decedent’s estate includes not only the probate estate but also a 
variety of non-probate transfers. Unfortunately, neither federal nor state law is 
entirely clear on how liability should be apportioned among the recipients of 
some of these transfers. Moreover, although federal and state law give dece-
dents considerable latitude to specify who should bear tax liability, what speci-
fication is adequate to overcome default allocations remains fraught with con-
fusion. Point (a) addresses liability for estate taxes when the governing instru-
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ments are silent on that issue.200 Point (b) discusses the effect of language in 
the dispositive instruments.201 
a. Liability When the Dispositive Instruments Are Silent 
When decedents transmitted most of their assets through the probate es-
tate, the respective roles of state and federal law were relatively clear: federal 
law governed how much estate tax was due, and state law governed how the 
tax would be apportioned among the estate’s beneficiaries. With the growth of 
testamentary substitutes, the roles of state and federal law have become mud-
dier. The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) makes explicit provisions for 
some non-probate transfers, but not others, and state law about the tax liability 
of beneficiaries of non-probate transfers is not always clear. 
Consider a decedent whose assets pass entirely through probate. Section 
2002 of the Code imposes on the estate’s executor or administrator the obliga-
tion to pay the estate tax.202 Federal law, however, does not control which of 
the estate’s beneficiaries pay the tax; that is an issue on which state law con-
trols.203 Unlike debts, which most states treat as an expense of the estate, to be 
borne by the estate’s residuary beneficiaries, states overwhelmingly provide 
for apportionment of estate taxes among the estate’s beneficiaries. For in-
stance, if a decedent had an estate valued at $7 million, and a will leaving $1 
million to her grandchildren and the balance to her children, state apportion-
ment statutes would require that one-seventh of the estate tax due be subtracted 
from the grandchildren’s $1 million share.204 Testator could alter that distribu-
tion of the tax burden by including in her will a “direction against apportion-
ment.” This would reduce the size of the residuary estate and leave the grand-
children’s $1 million intact. A single provision in a single document operates to 
control allocation of the tax burden among estate beneficiaries. 
Now, consider a decedent whose estate also includes a life insurance poli-
cy, a 401(k) account, an IRA, a revocable trust, and a POD bank account. All 
of those assets will be included within decedent’s taxable estate. Federal law is 
no longer silent on allocation of the tax burden. Section 2206 of the Code re-
quires that the beneficiaries of the life insurance policy bear a proportionate 
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share of the total estate tax.205 Section 2207B requires that the beneficiaries of 
the revocable trust bear a proportionate share of the tax burden.206 By contrast, 
the Code includes no comparable provisions governing IRAs, 401(k)s or POD 
accounts.  
As Professor Ira Bloom has persuasively argued, relying on legislative his-
tory and statutory purpose, sections 2206 and 2207B appear to preempt state 
apportionment law with respect to transfers covered by those statutes.207 But the 
general assumption has been that state law governs apportionment of tax liability 
among non-probate beneficiaries not covered by those statutes. That assumption 
derives from the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Riggs v. Del Drago, in which 
the Court concluded that state law governs with respect to apportionment of tax 
liability among probate beneficiaries not expressly covered by federal statute.208 
The issue in Riggs was whether the predecessor of section 2206 preempted a 
New York statute apportioning tax liability among beneficiaries of decedent’s 
probate estate.209 The Court found no preemption.210 But Riggs did not involve a 
claim against the beneficiaries of non-probate transfers.211 Despite language in 
the opinion that might be read to limit the holding to statutes apportioning the 
probate estate,212 the opinion is almost universally read to permit state law to 
apportion liability among probate and non-probate transfers unless the Code ex-
pressly directs otherwise. 
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Not every state apportions estate tax liability against beneficiaries of POD 
and “transfer on death” (“TOD”) accounts.213 For instance, in Estate of Shep-
pard v. Schleis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the beneficiary of POD 
accounts and TOD accounts did not have to pay any share of decedent’s estate 
tax bill.214 There, the decedent died intestate with an estate valued at $12 mil-
lion.215 The decedent had also established a POD account and a TOD account, 
worth a total of $3.8 million, naming his goddaughter as beneficiary.216 The 
estate sought reimbursement from the goddaughter for estate taxes paid by the 
estate.217 The court acknowledged that many states have statutes requiring 
beneficiaries of non-probate transfers to pay a share of estate tax liability, but 
noted that Wisconsin had no statute directing apportionment.218 In the absence 
of federal or state statute, the court declined to recognize an equitable appor-
tionment principle that would require contribution from the beneficiary of 
POD and TOD accounts.219 
Estate of Sheppard presumably settles the law in Wisconsin (absent sub-
sequent statutory enactments), but the same issue remains open in other states 
where the issue has not been explicitly resolved by statute or authoritative 
court decision. Moreover, choice-of-law problems sometimes compound the 
confusion. For instance, in Estate of McGathy, the Court of Appeals of Arizona 
held that state law applied to the apportionment of estate tax liability.220 In that 
case, an Arizona decedent had executed her will ten years before her death in 
her then-domicile, New York.221 New York, but not Arizona, provided for ap-
portionment of estate tax liability against non-probate transfers.222 Decedent’s 
will was silent about apportionment, and decedent died with a life insurance 
policy, an annuity contract, and a residence held in joint tenancy.223 The court 
concluded that Arizona law applied, and held that the residuary estate should 
bear all estate tax liability.224 The court rejected the estate’s argument that, at 
the time she wrote her New York will, the decedent expected that New York 
apportionment law would apply.225 It also declined to address the liability of 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See Estate of Sheppard v. Schleis, 782 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Wis. 2010). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 89. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 94. 
 219 Id. at 96. 
 220 No. 1 CA-CV 09-0022, 2011 WL 3300393, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011). 
 221 Id. at *1. 
 222 Id. at *2. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at *3. 
 225 Id. 
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the life insurance beneficiaries under federal law—because neither party’s 
lawyers raised the issue!226 
b. The Effect of Language in Dispositive Instruments 
Federal and state statutory provisions furnish default rules for apportion-
ment of estate tax burdens, but those default rules are always subject to over-
ride by express language in decedent’s dispositive instrument or instru-
ments.227 When decedent’s property passes entirely through probate, a simple 
clause in testator’s will can deal with the apportionment problem. 
The ascendancy of non-probate transfers does not preclude a properly ad-
vised decedent from allocating estate tax burdens as she sees fit. But at least 
three separate, but sometimes related, problems make frustration of decedent’s 
wishes (not to mention expensive litigation) more likely. First, too many law-
yers still do not understand the interplay between non-probate and probate 
transfers, and fail to draft appropriately. Second, because, as Professor Lang-
bein observed, distribution of property now proceeds through multiple “wills” 
rather than one, conflict among the documents becomes a more significant 
problem.228 Third, even if a lawyer engages in impeccable drafting, an uncoun-
seled client may undo the lawyer’s efforts by making non-probate transfers not 
anticipated by the lawyer.  
Consider first the drafting issues facing a testator who wants to make sure 
that the entire tax is borne by the residuary beneficiary of her probate estate 
rather than other will beneficiaries or beneficiaries of non-probate transfers. 
Directing that estate taxes be treated as an expense of the estate, or be paid out 
of the residue—a strategy used by some lawyers—is problematic because there 
may be no residue, leading to litigation about the testator’s probable intent.229 
Moreover, even if the estate would be sufficient to pay the taxes, courts have 
occasionally concluded that the direction is not precise enough to avoid appor-
                                                                                                                           
 226 Id. at *2, n.3. 
 227 For instance, in Rosen v. Wells Fargo Bank Texas, N.A., the drafter provided that taxes “shall 
be paid out of the residue of my estate without apportionment.” 114 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tex. App. 
2003). 
 228 See Langbein, supra note 1, at 1109. 
 229 See, e.g., Rosen, 114 S.W.3d at 150 (will stated that estate taxes “shall be paid out of the resi-
due of my estate without apportionment” and provided that in the absence of a residue, the court 
should apportion liability among probate assets and beneficiaries of life insurance policies and gift to 
minors account); In re Wesey, No. 342395, 2007 WL 1702514, at * 1 (Surr. Ct. June 8, 2007) (will 
directed executor “to pay from my residuary estate all estate, transfer, inheritance, succession or other 
death taxes . . . upon or in respect of all property, whether passing under or outside this Will, includa-
ble as part of my gross estate for the purpose of computation of any such taxes” and provided that, if 
residue of estate were insufficient to pay taxes, residuary beneficiary of revocable trust would pay tax, 
instead of apportioning tax among will beneficiaries). 
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tionment.230 Conversely, if the direction is too precise—for instance, by explic-
itly stating that a non-probate asset is to be excused from bearing a share of the 
tax burden—at least one court has concluded that the failure to name another 
non-probate asset justified an inference that testator intended apportionment 
against that other asset.231 
Next, consider the conflicts that arise when a decedent has engaged in es-
tate planning that includes both a will and a revocable trust. Typically, those 
documents will have been drafted at the same time, and coordinated with one 
another. But, even then, the potential for conflict exists. Estate of Thornhill v. 
Bloom is illustrative.232 On the same day, testator executed a trust agreement 
and a “pour over will.”233 The will provided that inheritance taxes should “be 
paid out of and be charged generally against the principal of my residuary es-
tate without reimbursement from any person.”234 The trust agreement, by con-
trast, included no comparable language about estate taxes, but did provide that 
“the Trustee may, in the Trustee’s discretion, pay, out of the trust, the debts of 
the Grantor, the estate and inheritance Taxes, . . . arising because of the Gran-
tor’s death . . . . The Trustee may pay any such taxes directly or . . . distribute 
such sums to the Personal Representative as shall be necessary to pay all or 
any portion of such taxes.”235 Relying on language in the will indicating that 
the probate assets were to be distributed in accordance with the terms of the 
trust, the court concluded that the trust language controlled, and that estate tax-
es should therefore be apportioned.236 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See, e.g., Pleska v. Zakutansky, 459 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (where will directed 
that estate taxes be paid out of the corpus of the estate, court nevertheless apportioned against joint 
bank account after holding that the specificity of testator’s general bequests “support[ed] a determina-
tion that he did not intend for his probate estate to be exhausted by the payment of taxes on the non-
probate assets.”). Moreover, litigation has arisen over the sufficiency of the will’s language even in 
those cases where the court ultimately sustains the direction. See Peterson v. Masye, 993 S.W.2d 217, 
220–22 (Tex. App. 1999) (where will directed payment of death taxes out of estate and defined death 
taxes to include “estate, inheritance, and succession taxes . . . which are assessed by reason of my 
death[,]” estate beneficiaries argued that language was insufficient because it did not explicitly exon-
erate non-probate property from the burden of death taxes, but the court determined testator’s clear 
intent was to pay all death taxes out of residuary probate estate). 
 231 See Patrick v. Patrick, 182 S.W.3d 433, 435, 438 (Tex. App. 2005) (where will directed taxes 
payable by reason of death to be charged against and paid out of testator’s estate, and provided explic-
itly that “[n]o contribution for any of the above taxes upon the proceeds of any insurance policy on my 
life shall be made by the beneficiary . . . of any such insurance policy,” court relied on exclusion of 
life insurance to hold that will’s direction did not exclude IRA accounts from paying a share of estate 
tax). 
 232 No. 02A04–0908–CV–489, 2010 WL 1222757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 233 Id. at *1, *3. 
 234 Id. at *3. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at *7; see Blanton v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 2010–CA–001142–MR., 2011 WL 3862788, at 
*2, *9 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012) (struggling to reconcile language of will with language of trust 
instrument executed simultaneously). 
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Finally, consider the impact of events beyond the control of the estate-
planning lawyer. While the lawyer can coordinate a will and a revocable trust, 
the lawyer often has less control over other non-probate transfers. For instance, 
a client may acquire retirement accounts, or POD bank or brokerage accounts, 
without any lawyer participation. If the lawyer’s inquiries do not lead her to 
discover the existence of these accounts, the resulting estate plan might not 
reflect the client’s wishes about who should bear tax burdens. If the lawyer 
drafts a will providing that all estate taxes should be treated as an expense of 
the probate estate, and in fact the bulk of the client’s assets are held in IRA or 
POD accounts, general and specific legatees may be wiped out—frustrating the 
decedent’s likely intent.237 Of course, a careful lawyer will generally be in a 
position to uncover any accounts the client has at the time of the consultation, 
but the lawyer has no control over future actions of the client (including open-
ing new brokerage accounts or changing beneficiaries on existing retirement or 
brokerage accounts) that would undermine the purpose of the will’s directions 
on tax apportionment. 
None of these problems existed at a time when the probate process was 
dominant and a single will operated to govern most succession questions.  
2. Liability for Decedent’s Debts and Estate Expenses 
If all of decedent’s assets pass through her probate estate, apportionment 
of liability for creditor claims is straightforward. Most default abatement rules 
provide that residuary devises abate before general devises, which abate before 
specific devises. Apportionment of liability becomes significantly more com-
plicated, and uncertain, when a decedent dies with a variety of non-probate 
assets. Point (a) discusses the apportionment of liability for the decedent’s 
debts and estate expenses under state law and examines the effect on revocable 
trusts, POD accounts, and TOD accounts.238 Point (b) examines the liability of 
beneficiaries of a decedent’s IRA for decedent’s debts and estate expenses.239 
Point (c) considers the liability of beneficiaries of retirement accounts covered 
by ERISA.240 Point (d) explores the difficulties faced by drafters who wish to 
depart from the default regime.241 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Cf. In re Poffenbarger, 961 N.Y.S.2d 731, 735 (Surr. Ct. 2013) (where decedent’s will includ-
ed direction against apportionment, court found charitable remainder beneficiary bore entire tax bur-
den, while wife, who was not a beneficiary under the will but the named beneficiary of two IRA ac-
counts, took accounts free of tax liability). 
 238 See infra notes 242–248 and accompanying text. 
 239 See infra notes 249–254 and accompanying text. 
 240 See infra notes 255–262 and accompanying text. 
 241 See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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a. State Law: Revocable Trusts, POD Accounts, and TOD Accounts 
Suppose decedent, a widow, dies with a will naming her daughter as ex-
ecutor, and leaving all of her property to her two children. In addition, she had 
a revocable trust and two POD accounts. The revocable trust and one of the 
POD accounts names her long-time companion as the primary beneficiary; the 
other POD account names the children. If decedent died with significant debts, 
how should liability for those debts be apportioned? To exempt the non-
probate transfers from all liability for creditor claims would enable debt eva-
sion by any decedent with the resources to obtain adequate counseling. Not 
surprisingly, not even the most debtor-friendly states have been willing to 
adopt that approach. 
If the non-probate assets are available to satisfy creditor claims, when 
should they be available—in all cases where the decedent left debts or expens-
es, or only in those cases where the probate estate is insufficient to satisfy de-
cedent’s obligations? The UPC and the UTC, following the prevailing ap-
proach,242 hold the beneficiaries of non-probate transfers liable for decedent’s 
debts only if the probate estate is insufficient to satisfy those debts,243 or if the 
will or some other dispositive instrument directs apportionment of liability.244 
UPC section 6-102 provides a comprehensive approach to creditor claims 
against non-probate property. The statute starts by defining non-probate trans-
fer to include all transfers effective at the transferor’s death to the extent that 
the transferor had the power, immediately before death, to revoke the transfer 
and use the property for the benefit of the transferor or her estate.245 The ex-
pansive statutory definition encompasses revocable trusts and POD and TOD 
accounts. The statute then provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
statute,” the transferee of any non-probate transfer is liable to the probate es-
tate for claims against the estate to the extent that the estate is insufficient to 
satisfy those claims.246 Finally, the UPC provides an order or priority: first, 
claims should be paid by any non-probate transferee designated in the govern-
ing instrument, second, by a trust serving as “the principal non-probate instru-
ment in the decedent’s estate plan,” typically but not inevitably the trust desig-
nated as the residuary beneficiary of decedent’s pour-over will, and third, by 
                                                                                                                           
 242 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 19001 (West 2011) (property subject to power of revocation at 
time of decedent’s death is subject to creditor claims “to the extent that the deceased settlor’s estate is 
inadequate to satisfy those claims”); In re Estate of Martin, 686 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (App. Div. 1999) 
(holding that creditors may reach non-probate assets upon proof that decedent’s estate is insolvent). 
 243 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102(b) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 357 (2013); UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 505(a)(3) (amended 2010). 
 244 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102(e), 8 U.L.A. 357; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(3). 
 245 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-102(a), 8 U.L.A. 357. The formulation explicitly excludes one form 
of non-probate transfer: the “transfer of a survivorship interest in a joint tenancy of real estate.” Id. 
 246 Id. § 6-102(b), 8 U.L.A. 357. The statute also subjects beneficiaries of non-probate transfer to 
claims for the UPC’s statutory allowances to decedent’s spouse and children. 
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other non-probate transferees in proportion to the value received.247 Under the 
UPC, then, if decedent dies with probate property valued at $50,000, a revoca-
ble living trust whose value at death was $100,000, a POD account valued at 
$50,000, and $100,000 in debts, the beneficiaries of the probate estate would 
take nothing, the beneficiaries of the revocable trust would take $50,000 of the 
trust property, and the POD account beneficiary would be unaffected by credi-
tor claims. 
The UPC’s scheme will generally operate effectively for any estate 
planned by a capable lawyer, but has the potential to frustrate the wishes of a 
decedent with less competent counsel or none at all. If the decedent or a lawyer 
with marginal estate planning experience drafts a will without recognizing that 
the will may be ineffective to distribute non-probate assets, the UPC’s scheme 
assures that creditor claims will be paid from the probate estate, even though 
the decedent assumed that a later-drafted will would supersede any (potentially 
stale) designations previously made on a bank or brokerage, or retirement ac-
count. So, for instance, if decedent established a brokerage account naming her 
mother as a POD beneficiary, and then, ten years later, executed a will leaving 
all of her property to her husband, debts and estate expenses would be borne 
by the husband, not the mother (unless the debts exceeded the value of the 
probate estate, triggering a right to reach non-probate assets).248 In a world 
where all assets passed through the probate process, this problem would not 
have arisen. 
The UPC’s scheme also undermines common abatement rules (including 
the UPC’s) that give priority to specific devises over general devises and ac-
cord last priority to residuary devises. For instance, if decedent writes a will 
leaving all of her jewelry and other personal property to her children, and the 
remainder of her estate to her husband, the husband, as residuary beneficiary, 
would bear the cost of any debts unless the debt exceeded the value of the re-
siduary estate. By contrast if the decedent writes the same will, and holds 
$100,000 in a POD account naming the husband as beneficiary, UPC section 
6-102 would require the children to relinquish their specifically devised prop-
erty before the husband would have to relinquish any of the POD account. If 
one believes that the abatement rules, developed by courts and legislatures 
                                                                                                                           
 247 Id. § 6-102(c), 8 U.L.A. 357. 
 248 The UPC’s scheme also undermines the typical abatement rules, common to most statutes 
including the UPC, which give preferences to specific devises. For instance, if decedent writes a will 
leaving all of her jewelry and other personal property to her children, and the remainder of her estate 
to her husband, the husband, as residuary beneficiary, would bear the cost of any debts unless the debt 
exceeded the value of the residuary estate. But if the decedent writes the same will, and holds 
$100,000 in a POD account naming the husband as beneficiary, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-601 would 
require the children to relinquish their specifically devised property before the husband would have to 
relinquish any of the POD account. 
104 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:61 
based on long experience generally reflect testamentary intent, it is hard to see 
how UPC Section 6-102 represents an improvement. 
b. Individual Retirement Accounts 
Recall that UPC section 6-102 subjects revocable transfers to creditor 
claims “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” In many states, whether or 
not the UPC is in force, IRAs receive special treatment with regard to creditor 
claims. Because IRAs are not covered by ERISA, ERISA’s anti-alienation pro-
visions do not apply, and state law therefore governs creditor rights. State stat-
utes often exempt an account holder’s IRAs from claims of the account hold-
er’s creditors, reflecting a public policy in favor of retirement security.249 That 
policy, of course, is far less compelling once the account holder (and perhaps 
her spouse) has died, but states vary considerably in their treatment of retire-
ment accounts after the death of the account holder.250 
Some states have enacted statutes that expressly exempt IRA assets from 
creditor claims against the estate of the primary account holder.251 In other 
states, courts have relied on less than crystalline statutory language to reach the 
same result.252 Other states take the opposite position, concluding that IRAs 
                                                                                                                           
 249 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-321a (2013) (exempting specified retirement accounts, in-
cluding IRAs from creditor claims); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6(8) (West. Supp. 2014) (exempting 
IRAs from creditor claims). 
 250 See Elaine H. Gagliardi, Remembering the Creditor at Death: Aligning Probate and Nonpro-
bate Transfers, 41 REAL PROP. PROB & TR. J. 819, 864 (2007) (noting that “[t]he law among states 
varies substantially regarding whether the state offers complete or partial protection for retirement 
plans”). 
 251 See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021(a) (West Supp. 2014) (providing that “a person’s 
rights to the assets held in or to receive payments . . . under any . . . pension, annuity, deferred com-
pensation, profit-sharing, or similar plan, including . . . an individual retirement account . . . is exempt 
from attachment, execution, and seizure for the satisfaction of debts to the extent the plan . . . is ex-
empt from federal income tax, or to the extent federal income tax on the person’s interest is de-
ferred”). The Texas statute further provides that “[t]he interest of a person in a plan . . . whether as an 
owner, participant, beneficiary, survivor, coannuitant, heir, or legatee, is exempt to the same extent 
that the interest of the person from whom the plan . . . was acquired was exempt on the date of the 
person’s death.” See id.; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.707(3)(a) (West Supp. 2011) (provid-
ing that creditors can reach assets over which a decedent had a right of revocation at death, but then 
providing that IRAs “shall not be considered a trust over which the decedent has a right of revoca-
tion”). 
 252 Two New York cases have taken this position. See In re Estate of King, 764 N.Y.S.2d 519, 
524 (Surr. Ct. 2003); In re Gallet, 765 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (Surr. Ct. 2003). A California statute ap-
pears to exempt IRA assets only to the extent necessary to provide support for the account holder’s 
dependents. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.115 (West 2009); NATHANIEL STERLING, CALI. LAW. 
REVISION COMM’N, BACKGROUND STUDY: LIABILITY OF NONPROBATE TRANSFER FOR CREDITOR 
CLAIMS AND FAMILY PROTECTIONS 16 (2010), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2010/MM10-
27.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/346C-6TLB. Nevertheless, an appellate decision held that an IRA 
made payable to beneficiary other than account holder’s estate is not subject to creditor claims. Wark 
v. Davis, 217 Cal. Rptr. 734, 735 (Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
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are available to the account holder’s creditors once the account holder dies.253 
In still other states, the liability of IRA beneficiaries remains uncertain because 
no statute expressly extends IRA exemptions past the account holder’s death, 
but courts have not yet had occasion to address whether the exemption im-
pliedly applies even after the account holder has died.254 
As a matter of policy, it is entirely unclear why a decedent whose assets 
are all held in a $200,000 IRA should be able to pass the IRA to his preferred 
beneficiaries free of all creditor claims, while a decedent with a $200,000 pro-
bate estate receives no comparable exemption for creditor claims. From an es-
tate planning perspective, the distortions created by disparate treatment of 
IRAs and other assets—both probate and non-probate—have the potential to 
frustrate decedent intent. For instance, if a decedent’s primary assets are a 
$200,000 IRA account at a brokerage account and a $200,000 POD account at 
the same firm, a decedent who has designated one of her children as IRA bene-
ficiary and the other as POD beneficiary will find the two accounts subject to 
radically different treatment with respect to creditor claims 
c. Retirement Accounts and the Preemption Problem 
Even if a state statute were to subject IRAs to creditor claims, the statute 
might well exclude one increasingly important category of decedent assets: 
those held in retirement accounts governed by ERISA, primarily 401(k) and 
403(b) accounts. Because these accounts typically allow the account holders to 
withdraw the funds they have contributed at any time (albeit with a tax penalty 
if the withdrawals are made prematurely), the accounts, on their face, would 
(like IRAs) appear to fall within the scope of non-probate transfers available to 
creditors under UPC section 6-102. 
A creditor seeking to reach these accounts after the account holder’s death 
would, however, face significant obstacles. The first is ERISA’s anti-alienation 
provision, which precludes creditors from advancing any claim against funds 
in a debtor’s retirement account while the debtor is alive.255 Whether the anti-
                                                                                                                           
 253 See Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Bolander, 239 P.3d 83, 95 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
statutory exemptions applicable to IRA accounts expire at the death of the account holder, at least 
where the account holder designated a revocable trust as the account beneficiary). 
 254 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-1(b) (West Supp. 2014) (exempting qualifying trusts and 
distributions from qualifying trusts from all creditor claims, but not indicating whether exemption 
extends beyond death of account holder). 
 255 Section 401(a)(13) provides that a trust shall not be qualified within the meaning of the statute 
“unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be 
assigned or alienated.” 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (2012). The regulations enacted pursuant to the statute 
makes it clear that an assignment or alienation includes “any direct or indirect arrangement (whether 
revocable or irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a right or interest 
enforceable against the plan in, or to, all or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may be-
come, payable to the participant or beneficiary.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(ii) (2014). 
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alienation provision continues to insulate retirement account funds from credi-
tor claims once the claims have been distributed to designated beneficiaries 
remains unclear. Most, but not all, of the courts that have confronted the issue 
have held that the anti-alienation provisions no longer apply when the funds 
have been distributed to beneficiaries.256 
In 2013, the Supreme Court cast doubt on these holdings. In Hillman v. 
Maretta, a decedent’s second wife sued the decedent’s former wife who was 
the named beneficiary on decedent’s government-issued life insurance poli-
cy.257 The plaintiff based her claim on a Virginia statute requiring a divorced 
spouse designated as a beneficiary to disgorge the policy proceeds.258 Although 
federal law was entirely silent on the effect of divorce on beneficiary designa-
tions, the Court nevertheless held that federal law requiring payment of gov-
ernment-issued life insurance policies to the persons designated as beneficiar-
ies preempted the Virginia disgorgement statute.259 The Court rejected the ar-
gument that federal law was concerned only with the administrative conven-
ience that results from allowing the government to pay policy proceeds to the 
designated beneficiary, finding instead a congressional intent that policy pro-
ceeds “would actually ‘belong’ to that beneficiary”260 and that the proceeds 
will “be paid to the named beneficiary and that the beneficiary can use 
them.”261 
Although Hillman involved construction of the Federal Employees’ 
Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA), not construction of ERISA, the likeli-
hood seems depressingly great that the Court would apply the same analysis to 
ERISA,262 and would hold that state law giving a claim to persons against the 
designated beneficiary is preempted by federal law directing payment to the 
designated beneficiary. If that is so, the UPC or any other state statute would 
be ineffective in its effort to give creditors a claim against beneficiaries of 
ERISA-governed retirement accounts, resulting in arbitrary, and potentially 
intent-defeating, distribution of the burden to satisfy creditor claims. 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See, e.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 54, 55 (1st. Cir. 2004) (considering a parallel provision 
to section 401 and joining majority of courts after noting that “[f]our of the five courts of appeals to 
consider the question have construed § 1056(d)(1) as applying to benefits only while held by the plan 
administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary”). But see United States v. Smith, 
47 F.3d 681, 684 (4th. Cir. 1995) (holding that anti-alienation provisions do apply to post-retirement 
annuity benefits even after they are distributed to the beneficiary). 
 257 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2013). 
 258 Id. at 1947. 
 259 Id.  
 260 Id. at 1952 (quoting Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 56 (1981)). 
 261 Id. at 1953. 
 262 See generally John H. Langbein, Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer 
Law in Beneficiary Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665 
(2014) (providing penetrating criticism of the Hillman decision). 
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d. Language in the Dispositive Instruments 
We have discussed the difficulties that face the drafter who seeks to avoid 
the default regime for tax liability by including appropriate language in the 
dispositive instruments. The same difficulties face the drafter seeking to depart 
from the default regime for liability for debts and expenses.263 
3. Coordinating Estate Assets and Liabilities 
Even when a decedent’s dispositive instruments, augmented by state and 
federal law, make it absolutely clear which assets are liable for payment of tax-
es and estate obligations, an important issue remains: who bears responsibility 
for making sure a decedent’s directions (and state and federal law) are fol-
lowed? For a decedent who holds only probate assets, the responsibility for 
paying taxes and assessing and paying creditor claims falls on a single person: 
the estate’s executor or administrator. The executor or administrator has both 
the power and the incentives to coordinate estate assets and liabilities. Title to 
all of the decedent’s property vests in the executor or administrator upon ap-
pointment, giving the executor or administrator power and responsibility to use 
those assets to satisfy outstanding tax and debt liabilities. At the same time, 
personal liability for failure to distribute estate assets properly creates adequate 
incentive for the executor or administrator to comply with the obligation to pay 
debts and taxes. 
By contrast, with a fragmented estate in which some but not all assets 
pass through the hands of the executor or administrator, no single person is in a 
position to ensure that debts and taxes are paid, or to ensure that liabilities are 
properly allocated among estate beneficiaries. Consider first the trustee of a 
revocable trust or the custodian of an IRA or a POD account. Although both 
owe fiduciary duties to the designated beneficiaries, neither has the power to 
marshal the decedent’s assets to ensure that those beneficiaries do not bear an 
excessive share of tax liability or liability to creditors. Of greater importance, 
neither has any incentive to ensure that their beneficiaries satisfy any tax or 
debt liability for which those beneficiaries might be obligated. 
Even though most jurisdictions subject revocable trust assets to creditor 
claims, a trustee with full knowledge of outstanding claims against the dece-
dent may not be personally liable for distributing trust assets to the trust bene-
ficiaries. In Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group v. Dobler, a California 
Court of Appeal illustrated the principle by holding that a trustee does not have 
                                                                                                                           
 263 Moreover, even if the drafter could overcome those difficulties, the Hillman case presents 
another potential obstacle for the person who wants to shift liability to ERISA plan beneficiaries: 
unless the obligation to pay debts appears in the plan documents, state law rules that would enforce a 
provision in a will or trust instrument might not be enforceable even against the beneficiaries named 
in those plan documents. 
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a general duty to preserve trust assets for the benefit of a creditor of the es-
tate.264 There, an incorporated medical group filed a claim in the probate pro-
ceeding of one of its founders, alleging breach of contract.265 While litigation 
between the medical group and decedent’s estate was pending, the trustees of 
the revocable trust distributed more than $500,000 to the designated benefi-
ciaries.266 The trustees, who were also the co-administrators of the decedent’s 
probate estate,267 were active participants in the litigation against the medical 
group. After the medical group obtained a judgment that exceeded $800,000,268 
but found that the remaining assets in the estate and trust were insufficient to 
satisfy the judgment, the group sought to surcharge the trustees for distributing 
assets while the litigation was pending.269 The court denied their petition, hold-
ing that a trustee has no general duty to preserve trust assets for the benefit of 
creditors with claims pending against decedent’s probate estate.270 The creditor 
retains a claim against the trust beneficiaries, even after the distribution,271 but 
not against the trustee.272 
Now consider the custodian of an IRA or POD account. In most states, 
the custodian does not have to rely on common law principles for insulation 
from creditor or tax claims. Instead, statutes explicitly protect the custodian 
who makes payment to the designated beneficiary from liability to anyone else 
with a claim to the assets.273 
                                                                                                                           
 264 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194, 195 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 265 Id. at 196. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. The judgment was entered less than two months after the trustees made their last payment 
to the beneficiaries. Id. 
 269 Id. at 197. The trustees had earlier resisted, unsuccessfully, the group’s petition to have the 
balance of its judgment (after exhaustion of decedent’s probate estate) satisfied from trust assets. Id. 
 270 Id. at 195. The court indicated that the trustees “only duty to such creditors is to refrain from 
affirmative misconduct that defeats the creditors’ reasonable expectation for a recovery from trust 
assets.” Id. The court later explained that a trustee might be liable if it distributed assets “knowing, for 
example, that an order in favor of the creditor has been entered and judgment is imminent, and the 
assets will be expended or otherwise unavailable to the creditor once distributed.” Id. at 205. 
 271 Id. at 203–04 (reasoning that “trust property legislatively authorized to be subject to a claim of 
the deceased settlor’s creditors is no less subject to that claim simply because it was transferred from 
one beneficiary of the trust (the settlor) to another”). 
 272 The court emphasized that the pendency of a probate proceeding “does not alter the trustee’s 
statutory duty to administer the trust solely for the benefit of trust beneficiaries,” suggesting that un-
like the personal representative of an estate, the trustee of a revocable trust owes no fiduciary duty to 
the settlor’s creditors. Id. at 203. Section 6-102(i)(2) appears to endorse the same result, at least unless 
the decedent’s personal representative sends the trustee “a written notice asserting that a decedent’s 
probate estate is nonexistent or insufficient to pay allowed claims.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-
102(i)(2) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 358 (2013). 
 273 The UPC authorizes a financial institution to pay sums on deposit to the designated benefi-
ciary “if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that the beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries survived all persons named as parties.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-223(2), 8 U.L.A. 378. The 
UPC then goes on to say that payment made “in accordance with the terms of the account discharges 
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Insulating trustees and custodians from creditor or tax claims helps chan-
nel money to beneficiaries more quickly, avoiding some of the delays associat-
ed with probate. If trustees and custodians were held liable for failure to with-
hold moneys necessary to pay creditor and tax claims, they would be reluctant 
to make distributions to beneficiaries until all potential claims were fully set-
tled. Once the prospect of liability is removed, the trustee or custodian has eve-
ry reason to distribute funds to beneficiaries even in cases like Arluk Medical 
Center, where the trustee knows that creditors have a plausible claim against 
non-probate assets. As a result, creditors, and potentially the executor, will face 
the more difficult task of recovering assets from the potentially fragmented 
group of individual beneficiaries, some of whom may quickly place the assets 
outside the easy grasp of creditors. 
The probate estate’s executor or administrator may be the only plausible 
candidate for coordinating tax and debt liabilities, but under current law the 
executor faces difficult hurdles. First, although statutes like UPC section 6-102 
give the executor power to serve notice on a financial institution holding a 
non-probate transfer indicating that the estate will be insufficient to satisfy 
claims and allowances, the statute provides no protection against a financial 
institution that distributes proceeds before the executor has assessed the finan-
cial state of decedent’s estate. The executor has no inherent common law au-
thority over assets that pass outside of probate, and without statutory authority, 
the executor may be unable to coordinate assets. Moreover, in cases where the 
probate estate is clearly insolvent because decedent used non-probate transfers 
to dispose of her assets, family members may see no reason to seek appoint-
ment as personal representative. In that event, creditors might have standing to 
seek appointment, but by the time creditors recognize the need to seek ap-
pointment, non-probate assets may all have been distributed.  
The proliferation of non-probate transfers, then, has created both a sub-
stantive problem—which beneficiaries are liable for debts and taxes—and a 
procedural problem—who is responsible for making sure the right beneficiar-
                                                                                                                           
the financial institution from all claims for amounts so paid, whether or not the payment is consistent 
with the beneficial ownership of the account as between parties, beneficiaries, or their successors.” Id. 
§ 6-226(a), 8 U.L.A. 380 (2013). The statute does provide that if a personal representative (but not a 
creditor) serves the institution with written notice that payment should not be permitted, the financial 
institution is not protected with respect to payments made after receipt of the notice. Id. § 6-226(b), 8 
U.L.A. 380; see also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 5403, 5405 (West 2009) (containing the same substance as 
the UPC provisions); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-5.4 (McKinney 2002) (insulating finan-
cial institution from liability for payment of funds to designated beneficiary); TEX. ESTATES CODE 
ANN. § 113.209 (West 2014) (same). The UPC applies the same rule to IRAs. UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§ 6-101, 8 U.L.A. 354 (2013). Section 6-101 defines non-probate transfers to include individual re-
tirement plans, and section 6-102(i)(1) provides that “[p]ayment or delivery of assets by a financial 
institution, registrar, or other obligor, to a nonprobate transferee in accordance with the terms of the 
governing instrument controlling the transfer releases the obligor from all claims for amounts paid or 
assets delivered.” Id. §§ 6-101, 6-102(i)(1), 8 U.L.A. 354, 358. 
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ies pay their share of the liability. To date, doctrine has not come up with ade-
quate solutions to those problems. 
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR ASSET DISSIPATION 
In both the probate system and the non-probate system, cases will arise in 
which an excluded beneficiary can establish that the exclusion was inconsistent 
with established legal rules. Imagine, for instance, a decedent whose dispositions 
leave nothing to her spouse, despite a legal regime that mandates a spousal share 
regardless of the decedent’s intent.274 Or suppose a close relative can establish 
that a testator’s dispositions were the product of incapacity, or undue influence. 
Cases like these present a problem in both a probate system and a non-probate 
system, and both systems handle the cases the same way: through litigation. 
 In fact, however, the structure of the non-probate transfer makes it less 
likely that deserving beneficiaries will be able to vindicate their rights through 
litigation. The primary problem is the increased likelihood that a wrongdoer 
will dissipate the decedent’s assets before beneficiaries realize that they have a 
valid claim. Section A provides background on asset dissipation in the probate 
system.275 Section B discusses asset dissipation in the non-probate system dur-
ing the decedent’s lifetime,276 while Section C discusses the same issue after 
the decedent’s death.277  
A. Asset Dissipation in the Probate System 
First, consider the structure of the probate system. The estate’s personal 
representative marshals all probate assets278 and provides notice to all benefi-
ciaries and intestate heirs that the will has been offered for probate.279 Any in-
terested party is then free to contest the will, or to assert another claim to the 
estate assets—such as an elective share claim, or an omitted child or spouse 
claim. The personal representative has no incentive to distribute funds until 
after settlement or judicial resolution of those claims, because the personal rep-
resentative would be liable for wrongful distribution of funds.280 Once the tes-
tator has died, then, judicial supervision of the personal representative’s ac-
tions limits the potential for asset dissipation. The primary opportunity for dis-
                                                                                                                           
 274 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A (McKinney Supp. 2014). 
 275 See infra notes 278–280 and accompanying text. 
 276 See infra notes 281–298 and accompanying text. 
 277 See infra Part III, Section C. 
 278 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 190 (2013) (empowering 
personal representative to take control of decedent’s property). 
 279 See, e.g., id. § 3-402, (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 86–87 (2013) (providing that notice be pro-
vided to heirs and devisees). 
 280 See, e.g., id. § 3-712 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 197 (2013) (personal representative liable to 
interested persons for damage or loss resulting from breach of fiduciary duty). 
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sipation comes before the testator dies, when a caretaker or other wrongdoer 
might induce an unsuspecting or incapacitated testator to transfer funds, either 
directly or through use of a power of attorney, that would otherwise pass to 
deserving beneficiaries. 
B. Non-probate Transfers: Asset Dissipation During a Decedent’s Lifetime 
For purposes of incapacity, undue influence, and the elective share, emerg-
ing doctrine in most states treats a revocable trust in which the settlor names her-
self as trustee as the functional equivalent of a will.281 If the settlor changes ben-
eficiaries, or dissipates assets, the beneficiaries harmed by the settlor’s actions 
have nearly the same opportunity to prove that the actions were tainted by inca-
pacity or undue influence as would the beneficiaries of a prior will.282 But sup-
pose the settlor does not name herself as trustee of the trust, but instead desig-
nates another person as the trustee. The Uniform Trust Code, mirroring the law 
in other states, provides that the trustee owes duties only to the settlor, not to 
other beneficiaries.  
But suppose the settlor has capacity but is simply no longer up to the task 
of monitoring the trustee’s actions. Does that mean the trustee gets a free pass 
against any claims for breach of fiduciary duty? Most, but not all, courts that 
have faced the question hold that the trust beneficiaries have standing to assert 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against the trustee, but only after the settlor’s 
death.283 The California Supreme Court’s opinion in Estate of Giraldin is illus-
                                                                                                                           
 281 There is near uniform agreement that the standard for capacity to create a revocable trust is 
identical to the standard for making a will. See, e.g., Jervis v. Tucker, 82 So. 3d 126, 128 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2012); Des Lauriers v. Marilyn Irene Deslauriers Revocable Trust, 374 S.W.3d 732, 736 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2010); Lah v. Rogers, 707 N.E.2d 1208, 1214 n.7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 601 (amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(2) (2003). But see Queen v. 
Belcher, 888 So. 2d 472, 476–77 (Ala. 2003) (holding that capacity to create revocable trust is higher 
than standard for executing a will); Suntrust Bank, Middle Ga., N.A. v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419, 425 
(Ga Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the capacity standard for contracts, not for wills, governs IRA desig-
nations).  
 282 Section 603(a) provides: “While a trust is revocable [and the settlor has capacity to revoke the 
trust], rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed 
exclusively to, the settlor.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (amended 2010). An earlier version of the 
UTC provided expressly that once the settlor lost capacity to revoke, the beneficiaries held enforce-
ment rights, but the current version bracketed the language about capacity, effectively giving states a 
choice about whether beneficiaries should have rights against the trustee once the settlor becomes 
incapacitated. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 (2004 amendment). One of the concerns the drafters cited 
in retreating from the UTC’s original position was the disparity between the treatment of revocable 
trusts and the treatment of wills. See id. 
 283 See, e.g., Estate of Giraldin, 290 P.3d 199, 210 (Cal. 2012), Siegel v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 
71 So. 3d 935, 945 (Fla. App. 2011); Siegel v. Novak, 920 So. 2d 89, 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); 
Brundage v. Bank of America, 996 So. 2d 877, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Before the death of the 
settlor, only the settlor may bring those claims. See, e.g., Ex parte Synovus Trust Co., 41 So. 3d 70, 74 
(Ala. 2009) (applying UTC section 603 to bar claims by remainder beneficiaries of revocable trust 
while settlors were still alive). 
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trative.284 There, the settlor, who had a total of nine biological and adopted 
children, created a revocable trust naming one of his twin sons as trustee.285 
The settlor funded the trust with more than $4 million of stock in a company 
started by the trustee’s twin brother, in which the trustee was also a part own-
er.286 The settlor died less than two years later.287 Because the company did 
badly, resulting in loss of most of the $4 million, several of settlor’s other chil-
dren—all of them remainder beneficiaries of the trust—brought an action al-
leging that trustee had breached his fiduciary duty.288 In rejecting the trustee’s 
argument that the beneficiaries lacked standing, the court noted that California 
statutes did not expressly address the issue, but relied in part on a comment to 
UTC section 603 indicating that “[f]ollowing the death or incapacity of the 
settlor, the beneficiaries would have a right to maintain an action against a 
trustee for breach of trust.”289 The court expressed no view on the merits of the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim,290 but indicated that the beneficiaries had 
standing, after the settlor’s death, to raise the claim that the trustee had 
breached his fiduciary duty to the settlor.291 
The court’s holding in Giraldin leaves trust beneficiaries in a position 
roughly comparable to that enjoyed by beneficiaries challenging a wrongful 
transfer of decedent’s assets by a person holding a power of attorney. But other 
courts have held that beneficiaries may not challenge the actions of a trustee of 
a revocable trust, even after the death of the settlor. In 2013, the Iowa Supreme 
Court held that remainder beneficiaries are not entitled to require the trustee of 
a revocable trust to account for periods before the settlor’s death.292 In In re 
Trust of Trimble, the settlor had remained the trustee of her revocable trust un-
til eight months before her death at the age of 104.293 When she died, one of 
the settlor’s nieces sought an accounting from the niece’s sister, the successor 
trustee, for the eight-month period before settlor’s death.294 In rejecting the 
Giraldin approach, the court suggested that the settlor’s interest in privacy mil-
                                                                                                                           
 284 See 290 P.3d at 199. 
 285 Id. at 201. 
 286 Id. at 202. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. at 209 (emphasis omitted) (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (amended 2010)). 
 290 Giraldin, 290 P.3d at 210. 
 291 Id. Other cases reaching the same conclusion include an earlier California case, Evangelho v. 
Presoto, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1999), as well as cases from other jurisdictions. See 
Siegel v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 71 So. 3d 935 at 945 (applying New York state law); Siegel v. 
Novak, 920 So. 2d at 95 (applying New York state law); Brundage, 996 So. 2d 877, 882; see also In 
re Estate of Allmares, 737 N.W.2d 612, 614 (N.D. 2007) (allowing beneficiaries of POD account to 
bring claim against conservator for failing to restore money to POD account after theft). 
 292 See In re Trust of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Iowa 2013). The court conceded that the 
applicable Iowa statutes were ambiguous on the point. Id. at 485. 
 293 Id. at 478. 
 294 Id. at 479. 
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itated against giving beneficiaries a right to an accounting,295 and emphasized 
that in the time before settlor’s death, settlor’s interests and the beneficiaries 
might not be perfectly aligned.296 The result is to insulate the trustee from 
claims by trust beneficiaries even when there is no evidence that the settlor 
was monitoring trustee behavior in the settlor’s declining years.297 Trimble, 
then, increases the potential for a faithless trustee to deplete decedent’s assets 
without leaving any recourse for the decedent’s intended beneficiaries.298 
C. Non-Probate Transfers: Asset Dissipation at a Decedent’s Death 
In addition to the risk of asset dissipation during a decedent’s lifetime, 
non-probate transfers present expanded opportunities for asset dissipation at a 
decedent’s death. If a decedent established a POD account with a bank or a 
TOD account with a brokerage firm, the bank or financial institution is entitled 
to pay or transfer the assets without providing notice to heirs or other potential 
beneficiaries, and without any judicial supervision. The same is true of the 
trustee of a revocable trust that authorizes payment on death of the settlor. If 
the designated beneficiary secured the designation as a result of undue influ-
ence, or at a time when the decedent had lost capacity, the “rightful” benefi-
ciaries may not learn of the designation until after the wrongdoers have re-
ceived the assets. By that time, they may not find it worthwhile to litigate be-
cause the wrongdoers may have immediately dissipated or hidden the assets. 
Moreover, unlike the personal representative of an estate, the financial institu-
tions that distributed the assets to the wrongdoer will bear no liability for the 
distribution. 
The relaxed formality associated with non-probate transfers exacerbates the 
asset dissipation problem. Many financial institutions will permit a depositor to 
make a POD designation online. Although this may be convenient for the de-
positor, it also provides a boon for potential undue influencers with access to the 
depositor’s password. And even if the depositor makes the designation by way of 
a paper form, the financial institution is unlikely to scrutinize the capacity or 
motivations of the depositor. As a result, upon death, it may be relatively easy for 
                                                                                                                           
 295 Id. at 487. 
 296 Id. at 488. 
 297 The Trimble result makes considerable sense in a situation where there is evidence that the 
settlor actually was monitoring the trustee’s behavior. See id. at 478; cf. In re Stephen M. Gunther 
Revocable Trust, 350 S.W.3d 44, 46, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that beneficiaries are not 
entitled to accounting from prior trustee when settlor took back reins from that trustee, and managed 
trust for three years without bringing action against prior trustee); Moon v. Lesikar, 230 S.W.3d 800, 
806 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that beneficiaries have no standing to make claim against trustee who 
served as co-trustee with the settlor). 
 298 See In re Trust of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d at 478. 
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a wrongdoer to obtain control over an account, and to dissipate the assets before 
other beneficiaries have an opportunity to challenge the designation. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The non-probate revolution has generated enormous savings for many de-
cedents and their beneficiaries. But these have come at a cost. While it is im-
possible to eliminate all of these costs, there may be ways to minimize many of 
them. This Article advances several proposals here to stimulate thinking about 
this question. Section A recognizes the importance of expanding lawyer 
awareness.299 Section B recommends the application of more intent-
effectuating constructional rules.300 Section C suggests that standardized forms 
should be improved,301 while Section D considers the benefits of requiring the 
provision of notice to executors.302 Finally, Section E considers the possibility 
of establishing a voluntary registration system as a potential solution.303  
A. Expand Lawyer Awareness 
As this Article has emphasized, many of the problems generated by the 
non-probate revolution arise because clients do not always consult lawyers to 
supervise non-probate transfers. As a result, no program of lawyer education 
can eliminate these problems. Nevertheless, greater lawyer awareness does 
have the potential to reduce frustration of client intent in those cases where 
clients consult lawyers to prepare wills, trust instruments, or other estate plan-
ning documents. Each lawyer, when consulting with an estate planning client, 
should inquire about any beneficiary designation forms and trust instruments 
the client might have executed, and develop a strategy for ensuring that these 
documents work together as part of a comprehensive estate plan. 
B. Expanded Adoption of Constructional Rules 
The most obvious way to minimize some costs associated with non-
probate transfers would be to apply more intent-effectuating rules of constuc-
tion to these transfers. The UPC has already embraced this strategy, and broad-
er enactment of statutes like UPC section 2-804, which extends the revocation-
on-divorce rule to all non-probate mechanisms, would be a helpful reform. 
The UPC itself, however, does not go far enough in extending rules of 
construction to non-probate transfers. The UPC could be amended to permit 
                                                                                                                           
 299 See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 300 See infra notes 305–307 and accompanying text. 
 301 See infra notes 308–310 and accompanying text. 
 302 See infra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 303 See infra notes 312–313 and accompanying text. 
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omitted spouses and children to reach revocable trusts and other non-probate 
assets. An even more significant improvement would be a revision to the 
comments to section 2-706 to provide that language included on a preprinted 
form is not a sufficient indication of intent contrary to the application of the 
section.304 That revision would extend application of the UPC’s antilapse rules 
to IRA beneficiary designations, life insurance policies, and other non-probate 
transfers typically executed on forms prepared by financial intermediaries. 
Another intent-effectuating reform—one suggested by John Langbein 
thirty years ago—could also be incorporated into the UPC or other state law: 
permit a subsequent will or trust instrument, by explicit language, to revoke a 
previously executed revocable trust instrument or beneficiary designation.305 
The only reason not to adopt such a reform is to protect financial intermediar-
ies, but as Langbein observed, it would be easy enough to insulate those inter-
mediaries from liability for paying the wrong beneficiary while still giving the 
intended beneficiary a claim against the beneficiary of a revoked trust or des-
ignation.306  
Rules of construction, however, are a less-than-ideal mechanism for ef-
fectuating decedent intent. These rules operate at the back end, cleaning up 
messes that arise when a decedent has executed documents without completely 
understanding their implications. They do nothing, however, to increase dece-
dents’ understanding of the documents they sign. At best, they provide better-
educated guesses about what the account holder would have wanted if the ac-
count holder had understood the documents. By their very nature, rules of con-
struction involve litigation and delay in distribution, sacrificing one of the pri-
mary efficiency advantages of the non-probate system. 
C. Standardized Forms 
If the goal is to capture the intent of the decedent who uses the non-
probate system, reform might better focus on ensuring that decedents under-
stand the documents they sign. Lawyers, who typically supervise preparation 
of wills, play an important role in explaining the significance of a document’s 
language. By contrast, lawyers rarely supervise execution of life insurance po-
lices, retirement account beneficiary designation forms, or POD or TOD ac-
count forms. Increasingly, decedents execute revocable trusts with little or no 
lawyer supervision. Without a professional to translate the documents, it be-
come critical that the documents be easy for a layperson to understand and 
                                                                                                                           
 304 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-706 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 291–94 (2013). The language 
would be parallel to current section 2-706(b)(3), which provides that general language of survivorship 
does not constitute “sufficient indication of an intent contrary to the application of this section.” Id. 
§ 2-706(b)(3), 8 U.L.A. 292. 
 305 Langbein, supra note 1, at 1138–39. 
 306 Id. at 1139. 
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navigate. As this Article has demonstrated, current life insurance and retire-
ment plan beneficiary designation forms generally fall wide of the mark.307 
Elsewhere, a design for retirement plan beneficiary designation forms has 
been suggested.308 Similar forms would be suitable for life insurance benefi-
ciary designations and these forms could also be adapted for revocable trusts. 
Statutory provisions could deny effectiveness to non-probate transfers unless 
the relevant documents are either prepared under the supervision of a lawyer, 
or prepared on a statutorily prescribed form. 
Some might object to a statutorily mandated from, arguing that market 
forces, instead of the state, should dictate the form to be used. As this Article 
has observed, information asymmetries make it unlikely that market competi-
tion will generate efficient forms.309 Potential account holders are unlikely to 
think about beneficiary designation forms when choosing banks, brokers, re-
tirement account custodians or life insurance providers. Employers, as repeat 
players, might have some leverage with life insurance companies and 401(k) 
or 403(b) custodians, but they have little financial stake in the issue, and deci-
sionmakers may lack knowledge of estate planning issues.310 
D. Notice and Expanded Authority for Estate Executors and Administrators 
Neither rules of construction nor better forms would address the problems 
generated by fragmentation of the decedent’s estate. Some of the difficulties 
associated with fragmentation—particularly coordination of tax and debt obli-
gations—might be ameliorated by expanding the power of estate executors and 
administrators—without requiring that non-probate assets pass through pro-
bate. Expanding executor power would also have the potential to reduce the 
risks of asset dissipation. 
The optimal scope of expanded executorial power remains open for dis-
cussion. At a minimum, executors should have clear authority to collect assets 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See supra notes 74–88 and accompanying text. 
 308 See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 8, at 231–37. 
 309 See supra notes 74–88 and accompanying text; see also Sterk & Leslie, supra note 8, at 223. 
 310 Professor Todd Rakoff has emphasized that even when the parties to a form contract are busi-
nesses, the adhering party may act reasonably in failing to read and shop for many of the terms in the 
form contract. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, 1250–55 (1983). For an employer choosing among plan providers, the language in beneficiary 
designation forms may be relatively unimportant compared to facts of cost and ease of plan admin-
istration. Moreover, with respect to employer-provided retirement accounts, small employers, faced 
with the high cost of individually-tailored defined-contribution plans, have increasingly turned to 
mass-marketed “prototype plans” for which the provider has obtained preapproval from the IRS. See 
Rev. Proc. 2005-16, 2005-10 I.R.B. 674, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-05-16.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5NEN-WJKH (setting forth procedures for IRS approval of prototype 
plans). By contrast, account custodians have a stake in the forms used, and an overwhelming interest 
in reducing administrative costs. See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 8, at 224. 
2015] Reintegrating the Wealth Transmission System 117 
from trustees, custodians, and beneficiaries of non-probate transfers to pay 
debts and taxes owed either by the decedent or the decedent’s estate.  
One might even give the executor a broader power to adjust the dece-
dent’s non-probate dispositions in cases where giving effect to all of those dis-
positions would appear to frustrate the decedent’s overall estate plan. This Ar-
ticle advances this suggestion tentatively because it poses an increased risk of 
litigation by beneficiaries unhappy with the executor’s adjustment. That risk, 
however, could be minimized by creating a set of prerequisites or conditions to 
the executor’s exercise of the adjustment power. For instance, one could au-
thorize use of the adjustment power only in cases where decedent has prepared 
an estate planning document with the assistance of counsel, but subsequently 
made a non-probate transfer without the benefit of counsel. 
Giving executors expanded power over non-probate assets would accom-
plish nothing if the executor had no mechanism to learn of those assets. Else-
where, it has been argued that custodians of retirement plan assets should, upon 
learning of the death of the account holder, be required to provide notice to the 
account holder’s spouse and children, if any, before distributing account pro-
ceeds.311 Imposing a similar obligation on custodians of other nonprobate as-
sets—much as the executor of a probate estate has an obligation to notify dece-
dent’s intestate heirs—would go a long way toward preventing dissipation of 
non-probate assets, while also providing a mechanism for transmitting notice of 
the accounts to the estate’s executor or administrator.  
Once the custodian sends that notice, a modest thirty or sixty day waiting 
period on distribution should be required. During that period, the executor or 
administrator, armed with letters testamentary or letters of administration, 
would be entitled to demand that some or all of the assets not be distributed to 
the designated beneficiaries. The demand, which would also be served on the 
designated beneficiaries, would explain the nature of the claim—either that the 
funds were necessary for payment of debts or taxes, or that the beneficiaries 
were named at a time of incapacity or as the result of undue influence, or that 
the designation had been revoked by a subsequent instrument, such as a will. If 
the executor authorized the custodian to release some of the funds, those funds 
could be released immediately, even before expiration of the waiting period. 
Otherwise, the custodian would continue to hold the funds until provided with 
proof of judicial resolution or settlement.  
What would this waiting period accomplish? First, it would enable the es-
tate executor to guard against dissipation of assets, preserving for the estate 
and any other potential beneficiariis the practical ability to obtain meaningful 
judicial resolution of claims. Second, it would enable the executor to determine 
what share of the estate’s debt and tax burdens should be borne by beneficiar-
                                                                                                                           
 311 See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 8, at 226. 
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ies of the probate estate, and what share should be borne by the beneficiaries of 
various non-probate transfers. That information might even speed up distribu-
tion of decedent’s probate estate.  
For the vast majority of estates, the waiting period and expanded executo-
rial authority would result in trivial change from current practice. Because 
there will be no dispute over how obligations will be paid or how assets will be 
distributed, the executor will not exercise the power to demand that the custo-
dian retain control of non-probate assets. The only change will be that the ben-
eficiaries will have to wait thirty or sixty days for distribution of the assets. 
The delay would not be significant; even in the current regime, few beneficiar-
ies run from the funeral directly to the bank or the insurance company. Moreo-
ver, those beneficiaries who do rush to seek distribution will often need to col-
lect the paperwork necessary to satisfy the financial institution’s bureaucrats 
that they are entitled to payment. And in cases of no controversy, the executor 
would be able to expedite payment by waiving her right to demand that assets 
not be distributed to the designated beneficiaries. 
The delay would be significant only in cases of real dispute. Nevertheless, 
those are precisely the cases where delay is appropriate if the goal is to ensure 
that decedent’s wishes are respected.  
E. A Voluntary Registration System 
Although enhancing executor power to coordinate non-probate assets after 
death would be helpful in many estates, it represents a second-best solution. The 
optimal solution would increase the likelihood of coordination by the decedent 
while she is still alive. As shown above, even when a decedent relies on lawyer 
to coordinate her estate plan, the lawyer’s careful plan might go awry if the cli-
ent subsequently makes non-probate transfers—opening up a new IRA account, 
or setting up a revocable trust—without consulting the lawyer. The lawyer her-
self is at the client’s mercy in identifying the client’s nonprobate assets. 
A promising way to address this problem would be to establish a nation-
wide voluntary registation system, in which, whenever a person made a non-
probate transfer, the transfer would be registered in a centralized database. The 
bank, brokerage, insurance company, or other entity responsible for managing 
the assets would be charged with the registration responsibility. Whenever a 
person sought to make a new non-probate transfer, the financial institution or 
lawyer supervising the transfer would check the database to see what other 
transfer, if any, the client had made, and would notify the client about the bene-
ficiaries the client had designated for each of those transfers. 
A registration system that confronted the client with past designations 
whenever the client made a new designation would, by itself, assist the client 
in updating old designations and in coordinating new designations with old 
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ones. Registration would also make it easier for lawyers to ensure that the es-
tate plans they devise deal comprehensively with all of the client’s assets. Reg-
istration, therefore, might go a long way to eliminating some of the problems 
that result from fragmentation of the wealth transmission process. 
Of course, some clients, perhaps concerned about privacy, would steer 
clear of any registration system, but those clients would be no worse off than 
they are under current law. Perhaps their lawyers could convince at least some 
of them of the merits of a registration system, that would essentially enlist both 
lawyers and financial intermediaries in the process of coordinating the client’s 
estate. 
Ultimately, the biggest challenge of establishing a registration system 
might be financing, creating, and maintaining the database. But as technology 
reduces costs, even a government-maintained database might not be prohibi-
tively expensive. In other areas of law—real property recording systems, for 
instance—government entities have undertaken the task of establishing com-
puterized databases of property transfers.312 At the same time, private entities 
have established databases that compete with the government database.313 In 
the wealth transfer context, the IRS, which already obtains records of many of 
the accounts held by each person, might have comparative advantages in estab-
lishing a database. The point is not that a private or public database would be 
superior, but that any centralized database has the potential to overcome many 
of the coordination problems generated by the non-probate revolution. 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See, e.g., Emily Bayer-Pacht, The Computerization of Land Records: How Advances in Re-
cording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 337, 340–44 (2010) (detailing growth of electronic recording of land records). 
 313 In the real property context, Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), a 
privately held company operates a centralized, electronic registry to track mortgages. See generally 
Zachary A. Kisber, Revaluating MERS in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, 42 REAL EST. L.J. 183, 
189–90 (2013) (describing the structure of MERS); Nolan Robinson, The Case Against Allowing 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Initiate Foreclosure Proceedings, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1632–34 (2011) (describing how MERS works). 
   
 
